A secure routing protocol against byzantine attacks for MANETs in adversarial environments

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2-12-2009

Abstract

To secure a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) in adversarial environments, a particularly challenging problem is how to feasibly detect and defend possible attacks on routing protocols, particularly internal attacks, such as a Byzantine attack. In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm that detects internal attacks by using both message and route redundancy during route discovery. The route-discovery messages are protected by pairwise secret keys between a source and destination and some intermediate nodes along a route established by using public key cryptographic mechanisms. We also propose an optimal routing algorithm with routing metric combining both requirements on a node's trustworthiness and performance. A node builds up the trustworthiness on its neighboring nodes based on its observations on the behaviors of the neighbor nodes. Both of the proposed algorithms can be integrated into existing routing protocols for MANETs, such as ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) and dynamic source routing (DSR). As an example, we present such an integrated protocol called secure routing against collusion (SRAC), in which a node makes a routing decision based on its trust of its neighboring nodes and the performance provided by them. The simulation results have demonstrated the significant advantages of the proposed attack detection and routing algorithm over some known protocols. © 2009 IEEE.

Identifier

59649116337 (Scopus)

Publication Title

IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology

External Full Text Location

https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2008.923683

ISSN

00189545

First Page

449

Last Page

460

Issue

1

Volume

58

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