Negotiation over Costs and Benefits in Brownfield Redevelopment

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

7-1-2011

Abstract

A quantitative methodology is developed to support negotiations over the allocation of costs and benefits in brownfield redevelopment projects by utilizing cooperative game theory. In particular, guidelines for estimating the net benefits of various coalitions that can be formed by the landowners, developers and governments are presented. A general n-player cooperative game is formulated to model the negotiations. Two simple conditions are obtained for checking whether or not a three-player brownfield redevelopment negotiation game has a nonempty core. Various nucleolus concepts and the Shapley value are utilized to find alternative fair cost and benefit allocation schemes, from which the decision makers can negotiate. An illustrative example is employed to demonstrate how the proposed approach can be applied in practice. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Identifier

79958169721 (Scopus)

Publication Title

Group Decision and Negotiation

External Full Text Location

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9179-5

e-ISSN

15729907

ISSN

09262644

First Page

509

Last Page

524

Issue

4

Volume

20

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