A dynamic game-theoretic approach to the modified Prisoner's dilemma

Document Type

Conference Proceeding

Publication Date

1-1-2005

Abstract

In this paper a paradox similar to the classical Prisoners' Dilemma paradox is presented and analyzed using the theory of game transformation. This modified version of Prisoner's Dilemma is more paradoxical than the classical one and the process of game transformation, recently introduced in literature, is used to transform an intractable initial game to a solvable final game with a stable equilibrium state, which is also a rational outcome of the game. The transformation takes into account intangibles like uncertainties, risks, threats, aspirations and converts them into player motivation in the form of a global goal, is arbitrary to start with but the transformation solution is shown to remove this arbitrariness. © 2005 Oxford University Press.

Identifier

33750143278 (Scopus)

Publication Title

Logic Journal of the Igpl

External Full Text Location

https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzi037

e-ISSN

13689894

ISSN

13670751

First Page

493

Last Page

502

Issue

5

Volume

13

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