Ethical automaticity

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-1-2012

Abstract

Social psychologists tell us that much of human behavior is automatic. It is natural to think that automatic behavioral dispositions are ethically desirable if and only if they are suitably governed by an agent's reflective judgments. However, we identify a class of automatic dispositions that make normatively self-standing contributions to praiseworthy action and a well-lived life, independently of, or even in spite of, an agent's reflective judgments about what to do. We argue that the fundamental questions for the "ethics of automaticity" are what automatic dispositions are (and are not) good for and when they can (and cannot) be trusted. © SAGE Publications 2012.

Identifier

84857929840 (Scopus)

Publication Title

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

External Full Text Location

https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393111426402

e-ISSN

15527441

ISSN

00483931

First Page

68

Last Page

98

Issue

1

Volume

42

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