The normativity of automaticity

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-1-2012

Abstract

While the causal contributions of so-called 'automatic' processes to behavior are now widely acknowledged, less attention has been given to their normative role in the guidance of action. We develop an account of the normativity of automaticity that responds to and builds upon Tamar Szabó Gendler's account of 'alief', an associative and arational mental state more primitive than belief. Alief represents a promising tool for integrating psychological research on automaticity with philosophical work on mind and action, but Gendler errs in overstating the degree to which aliefs are norm-insensitive. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Identifier

84865351079 (Scopus)

Publication Title

Mind and Language

External Full Text Location

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01450.x

e-ISSN

14680017

ISSN

02681064

First Page

410

Last Page

434

Issue

4

Volume

27

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