An auction-based incentive mechanism for non-altruistic cooperative ARQ via spectrum-leasing

Document Type

Conference Proceeding

Publication Date

12-1-2009

Abstract

We propose and analyze a novel decentralized mechanism that motivates otherwise non-cooperative stations to participate as relays in cooperative ARQ protocol. Cooperation incentive is provided by the possibility for the source to lease a portion of retransmission slot for the traffic of relaying terminals. To further leverage the opportunistic nature of cooperative ARQ and obtain a fully decentralized solution, the (motivated) relaying nodes compete for access to the retransmission slot by trying to make the best retransmission offer. Effective arbitration of cooperative retransmissions is performed using auction theory (bidding), with the source in the role of the auctioneer, the relaying nodes acting as the bidders and the (use of the) retransmission slot as the bidding article. It is noted that the proposed solution can be seen as a practical framework for the implementation of cognitive radio networks running according to the property-rights model (spectrum leasing). Numerical results and analysis confirm the efficient dynamic resource allocation property of the proposed scheme, revealing the relevant gains in terms of expected number of (re)transmissions required for successful data delivery for both the source (primary) and the cooperating (secondary) nodes.

Identifier

77951567032 (Scopus)

ISBN

[9781424441488]

Publication Title

Globecom IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

External Full Text Location

https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2009.5425953

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