Date of Award

Spring 2002

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy in Transportation - (Ph.D.)

Department

Executive Committee for the Interdisciplinary Program in Transportation

First Advisor

Maria P. Boilé

Second Advisor

Lazar Spasovic

Third Advisor

Athanassios K. Bladikas

Fourth Advisor

John Tavantzis

Fifth Advisor

I-Jy Steven Chien

Abstract

The Stackelberg game betweenshippers and carriers in an intermodal network is formulated as a bi-levelprogram. In this network, shippers make production, consumption, androuting decisions while carriers make pricing and routing decisions.The oligopolistic carrier pricing and routing problem, which comprisesthe upper level of the bi-level program, is formulated either as a nonlinearconstrained optimization problem or as a variational inequality problem,depending on whether the oligopolistic carriers choose to collude orcompete with each other in their pricing decision. The shippers' decisionbehavior is defined by the spatial price equilibrium principle. Forthe spatial price equilibrium problem, which is the lower level of thebi-level program, a variational inequality formulation is used to accountfor the asymmetric interactions between flows of different commoditytypes. A sensitivity analysis-based heuristic algorithm is proposedto solve the program. An example application of the bi-level programmingapproach analyzes the behavior of two marine terminal operators. Theterminal operators are considered to be under the same Port Authority.The bi-level programming approach is then used to evaluate the PortAuthority's alternative investment strategies.

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