A meeting of minds: coalitions, representations and American non-governmental organizations in the Brazilian Amazon

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American environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have created and spread in the last decade a particular representation of the Amazon rainforest among the public and policy-makers. This new representation contrasts with earlier American representations of the Amazon in that it has been more responsive to local (Amazon) concerns and agendas. This greater responsiveness is a direct result of strategic coalitions with Brazilian NGOs by most US NGOs. US NGOs may avoid charges of "environmental imperialism" and obtain larger legitimacy in their action in the Amazon by opting for the coalition strategy. However, this option also stresses the differences between two environmental traditions, North and South, at the same time that it points out common areas of understanding. The primary sources used in this study are the documents and reports, published (paper pamphlets) and on-line (conferences), produced by the NGOs themselves and interviews with US NGO officers. The thesis analyses the Mahogany Campaign (1991-1997) as an example of a broad coalition between North and South NGOs.
A MEETING OF MINDS: COALITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON

by

Lise Fernanda Sedrez

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of New Jersey Institute of Technology in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Environmental Policy Studies

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences

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A MEETING OF MINDS:
COALITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
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This thesis is dedicated to
nonna Paulina, my parents Altino e Lisette Sedrez and my
husband and partner, Roberto Delpiano.

It is also dedicated to Guiça Neves, who taught me to love history; to
José Pádua, who taught me to love the Amazon;
and to John Opie, who helped me to put both loves together.
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UNEP  United Nations Environmental Program
US    United States of America
WTO   World Trade Organization
WWF   World Wildlife Fund
"Are you Brazilian?"

Query to the author by a Federal Police officer in the Amazon, after a direct action on the Motor Vessel Greenpeace.
CHAPTER ONE

1 INTRODUCTION

Only since the mid-80s have American environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Sierra Club or Environmental Defense Fund developed interest in and concern for the Amazon region. A preliminary review in the 1982 and 1983 issues of the Sierra Club magazine did not reveal any reference to the Amazon rainforest. Rainforest Alliance and Rainforest Action Network, organizations in the US exclusively dedicated to the preservation of the tropical rainforest, were founded in 1986 and 1987, respectively. Yet ten years later, in 1992, research showed that more than 70% of the US NGOs with international action dedicated some part of their agenda to issues concerning the Amazon (Mohd & Laarman, 1994). From mid-1980s on, American NGOs’ view of Amazon has helped to shape national and international policies regarding to the South American rainforest.

US NGOs’ growing influence in international environmental policy has been denounced by some local governmental officers as a new form of imperialism—an unjustifiable interference in internal activities of a sovereign country. International concern on the deforestation of the Amazon has been charged as an attempt for the “internationalization of the Amazon”: “[this international concern] built on a long-standing sensitivity with respect to the Amazon and existing accusations about international interest in the region” (Kolk, 1996, p. 5). The charge of environmental imperialism is also supported, although on a different basis, by some environmental activists. They allege that American NGOs are transporting their own values of wilderness to the Third World, which has its own parameters for a relationship with the nature (Guha, 1989; Luke, 1997). Such imposition, by disregarding local concerns, is not only imperialist but can be harmful to Third World societies and environments.
One example of this sort of environmental imperialism, according to R. Guha, is the creation of the Project Tiger in India. A network of parks aimed for the conservation of the tiger, the Project Tiger "transplanted the American system of national parks into Indian soil" and it was encouraged and acclaimed by the international environmental community. However, it was made possible only "by the physical displacement of existing villages and their inhabitants." For those traditional villages, the installation of national parks for the sake of the wilderness can be as oppressive and distressing as a huge dam. Regarding the Amazon, the impact of the action of the American NGOs in the region is unquestionable: Melone (1993), Conklin and Graham (1995) and Kolk agree that part of the achievements of Amazon local movements such as indigenous people's and rubber tappers', was due to their alliances with American and other Northern environmental NGOs.

American NGO policies for the Amazon are generated from their mental representation of the region. These policies reflect the values and/or biases held by such representation, and they will affect the Amazon accordingly. The problem, therefore, is to understand how the Amazon appears in the American environmental mentalité and how this representation was formed. To evaluate the charges of environmental imperialism, we need to recognize whether the idea of Amazon propagated by American NGOs is no more than the expansion of their own values of wilderness. Or is it rather a collective representation, for it has assimilated concerns and elements characteristics of the local NGOs' agendas? To do so, we should analyze the context in which the relationship between US NGOs and local NGOs takes place. Is this relationship a sheer co-optation of the legitimacy that local NGOs can

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1 The concept mentalité was created by French historiography. In a free translation, it means a mental outlook as expressed in discourse and artifacts, a way of thought that derives from a specific socio-cultural, economic structure. It is used here in a broader sense, to include the collection of representations and mental references belonging to a particular culture.
offer? Or is it a true collaboration between different agents, with clear benefits for both partners?

### 1.1 Methodology

This research derives from two different theoretical traditions: *histoire des mentalités* and environmental history. Although each of them has been developed mainly in different sides of the Atlantic Ocean (France and the United States), they have shared their respective major subjects very often. Environmental history belongs to American historiography. It asks how societies understand their own environments, which kind of interaction humans—in each society—build with the natural world surrounding them. (Opie, 1998, p. 5).

On the other hand, Fernand Braudel (1949), one of the founders of the *histoire des mentalités*, produced one of the more significant works on environmental history—*The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. More recently, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1967/1988), an acclaimed contemporary historian of mentalités, wrote *Times of Feast, Times of Famine: A History of Climate Since the Year 1000*. Although neither Braudel nor La Roy Ladurie defined themselves as environmental historians, the presence of environmental issues is an essential characteristic of their work.

We borrow from *histoire des mentalités* two key concepts for this study: **representation** and **mentalité**. I took both concepts from French cultural historiography, especially in the works of Jacques Le Goff and Fernand Braudel. “By representation,” says Le Goff, “I mean any mental image of a perceived external reality. Representation is related to the process of abstraction. The representation of a cathedral is our idea of it.” Mentalité, on the other hand, is more comprehensive than representation. The term is rather vague, and it has been used both to designate discourse and artifact—single mental constructions—and to define intellectual
universes, the collection of images and representations that constitute the horizon of references of a particular culture (Le Goff, 1988). To Fernand Braudel, *mentality* is as much a fact of a civilization as its economic structure or geographical environment. “In every period”, states Braudel (1987/1993, p. 22), “a certain view of the world, a collective mentality [mentality], dominates the whole mass of society.”

In order to build an oceanic bridge among these two historical traditions, we use complementary methodological techniques. Each of these adds a different approach to the problem (see following sub-items). A *timeline* will offer a chronological sequence to the research. *Comparative history* will situate our objects in their context and underline the differences and new aspects. *Discourse analysis* identifies mental representations in the sources and how such representations fit in the environmental *mentality*. *Structured interviews* will offer us an inside-view on how the actors see the image that themselves created. Finally, the *case study* underlies a particular interaction of American and Amazon agendas.

### 1.1.1 Timeline

Timelines are useful tools by historians; they put events in a chronological sequence without necessary linking them in cause-effect connections. Time is a central concept in history and timelines may be active, complex and multifaceted. They are the major frames that the historian built for the documents.

This thesis’ timeline focus on three major benchmarks. The first is the earlier US representations of the Amazon, until the middle of this century (Chapter 2, Earlier Images of the Amazon in the United States). The second benchmark is the incorporation of global concerns, including the Amazon rainforest, in the US NGOs Agendas, in the 1980s (Chapter 3, Thinking Globally, Acting Globally). Finally, the third benchmark (Chapter 4, Coalition: A
Network Made of Conflict, Diversity and Alliances) studies the analyses and evaluation of the experience of coalition between US and Brazilian NGOs, in the 1990s.

1.1.2 Comparative History

A comparative history approach should underline the differences and similarities between the two partners in this relationship (local and US environmental NGOs). A first basis for comparative analysis is how these partners consider the existence of forest people. The traditional concept of wilderness in US implies a representation of nature where humanity is not permanent presence. Most of environmental groups in Brazil, on the other hand, developed out of social and Indian rights movements, with strong support for forest people demands. For the same reason, control of natural resources has been an important element in the Brazilian NGOs agenda, while considerations for Nature per se are more common in the US conservationist movement. Finally, different historical contexts set the basis of support and legitimacy for local and for US environmental NGOs and support and legitimacy are key issues in this relationship.

Two other questions should provide us with a better understanding of the different representations of Amazon:

- The role of science in each different representation. Science can be the method to generate new information, or to conquer the forest through technology, or to guarantee sustainability.

- The values that are present in each representation and how they justify the different proposals for the Amazon. Some actors stress the importance of the Amazon forest for itself, while others underline the Amazon region as the provider of natural resources, or
the source of life for forest people. These different conceptions of the value of the Amazon are not necessarily exclusive, but they are not automatically compatible either.

1.1.3 Discourse Analysis

Discourses are cultural artifacts, products of the mentalité. Hence discourse analysis is a possible and privileged way of access to the mentalité and its representations. Although we will focus on the American environmental mentalité and its representation of Amazon, we will work at the borders of this mental universe, and how it answers to external influences. Hence the American environmental historian Richard White’s concept of “middle ground” is particularly useful. “Middle ground,” says White (1991, p. 255), “is the construction of mutually comprehensible world characterized by new systems of meaning and exchange”. White developed the middle ground concept to describe Indian-white relations in North America’s Great Lakes region in the 17th to 19th centuries. Through processes of confrontation, negotiation, and creative innovation, Indians and non-Indians (fur traders, soldiers, clerics, colonial officials) developed systems of communication and exchange through which both sides perceived their goals could be achieved. “White argues that these middle grounds were pragmatic, mutually constructed accommodations that do not fit a simple rubric of domination, subordination, and acculturation” (Conklin & Graham, 1995, p. 594). Therefore we should identify the boundaries of a middle ground in the representation of Amazon by American NGOs.

This middle ground can be identified through discourse analysis. This middle ground is a communication intersection, a “discursive community” out of the different backgrounds of the cultures that touch each other. The challenge is to find out how and if meanings were negotiated inside this discursive community, how the process of constructing a negotiated meaning
took place—a new representation of ideas and issues that makes a new sense out of competing or opposed ways of seeing (Flower, 1996). "Civilizations," says Braudel (1987/1993, p. 29), "are continually borrowing from their neighbors, even if they 'reinterpret' and assimilate what they have adopted." In other words, according to our hypothesis, we should be interested in how and if the Amazon NGOs' concerns were translated, reinterpreted and assimilated into the American NGOs' agendas.

Of course, the representation of Amazon is not present only in discourse, but also in artifacts. In a free application of these historiographic concepts to the sphere of environmental NGOs, the discourses and artifacts through which NGOs intend to shape the American environmental mentalité are their promotional literature (e.g., articles in magazines and media) and projects (e.g., campaigns). When Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth decide to promote a boycott on tropical mahogany, this concrete action carries a particular representation of the Amazon, as well as the more explicit institutional pamphlets and fact-sheets. Web Pages and on-line conferences are also an important source. Rainforest Action Network claims that its web page has 23,000 hits per week, and it is an important part of their strategy (R. Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997). Internet has also been an important communication tool between Brazilian and US NGOs. Its decentralized, low price characteristics have turned the Internet in a favored public forum for NGOs, and an important source for environmental historians (Sedrez, 1997).

This study focuses mainly on five of the most significant US NGOs concerned with the Amazon Rainforest: the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Rainforest Action Network, the Friends of the Earth and the Greenpeace. The Sierra Club is one of the oldest and more traditional American NGOs. The Environmental Defense Fund was created in the 1960s' in the second wave of the environmental movement (Gottlieb, 1992); it is an
important NGO lobby, with an extensive lobby activity for the rainforest and Amazon in particular. The Rainforest Action Network was founded in the third wave of the environmental movement (1980s) when US NGOs started to focus on international environmental problems. It is probably the first American NGO that has worked exclusively with rainforests issues. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have their headquarters in Amsterdam. Both were founded by Americans in Vancouver (1972) and San Francisco (1969), respectively. Although they are more international NGOs than American NGOs, they have a singular influence on the American environmental mentalité.

1.1.4 Oral history/Structured Interviews

Dealing with recent history—as, in the case of the last part of our study, the 1990's—we have the option of interviewing the actors that took part in the history, according to the oral history technique.

Structured interviews, by confronting different interviewers with the same issues, provide a comparative tool for the answers and, therefore, a comparison between the different produced discourses (McDowell, 1991).

A total of six NGO officers were interviewed: Stephen Schwartzman (current officer of the Environmental Defense Fund's International Program); David Malakoff (former officer of Friends of the Earth-US); Geoff Webb (former officer of Friends of the Earth-US); José Augusto Pádua (former officer of Latin America Greenpeace); José Roberto Borges (current officer of Rainforest Action Network's Program Brazil); and Roberto Smeraldi (current officer of Friends of the Earth's Program Amazon). The first three officers are Americans, and the last three, Brazilians.
Appendix I shows the questions used for the structured interviews. The questions were all sent by e-mail on September 15, 1998. They were composed of three parts: a brief identification of the officer, general information on the organization and a longer questionnaire on their action and thoughts about the Brazilian Amazon. The interviews ended with an overall assessment of the organization’s action in the Amazon.

Except for Schwartzman and Borges, whose interviews were conducted by phone, all the other officers answered the questions by e-mail. The list of interviewees and dates when the interviews were conducted are in Other References.

1.1.5 Case study

The thesis concludes with the presentation of a case study, the “Mahogany Campaign.” “Campaign” is defined as a number of articulated actions that have a common goal. The American political scientist Eikland (1994) identifies several tactics and actions that may be carried out in an NGO “campaign,” including direct action, consumer campaign, legal litigation, direct lobby, participation in official meetings and others. Illegal or non-sustainable mahogany logging is seen as the major cause for deforestation in the Amazon, for as a result it makes the forest vulnerable to other factors. By fighting against non-sustainable mahogany logging in the Amazon, in a campaign articulated with local (Brazilian) NGOs, American NGOs adopted an agenda and concerns generated by those local NGOs. Moreover, the international pressure empowered the Brazilian NGOs in their negotiations with the local government. Far from environmental imperialism and narrower concepts of wilderness, the Mahogany Campaign demonstrates the possible responsiveness in the American NGOs’ vision of the Amazon to local influences.
1.2 The Amazon Rainforest: Characteristics

Environmental problems are at once site specific and politically specific. They are site specific because they do not occur in the abstract, but within a geographical context, with concrete and particular characteristic—be it the ozone layer depletion or the deforestation of the Amazon. They are politically specific because they also occur within a political and historic context, such as the North-South conflict or the imperialistic experience. Therefore, tropical deforestation raises particularly difficult issues because of the fact that the forests are located within particular countries—in the Amazon case, the majority of the forest is located in Brazil—and that their preservation or destruction lies within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Brazilian state (Hurrell, 1992, p. 401).

The political context of the Amazon deforestation—and the movement to combat it—is partially developed in the Chapter 4 Coalition: A Network Made of Conflict, Diversity and Alliances. However, this section deals with some of the geographic characteristics of the Amazon forest that should be taken into account.

Although the Amazon is not limited to Brazil, the Brazilian Amazon is by far the largest remaining rainforest area in the world, comprising a relatively high percentage of largely intact forest (360,030,000 hectares of closed forest area in 1980 against the 123,235,000 of Indonesia, the second largest). Although estimates of the rate of total deforestation range from 8% to 20%, even the unlikely highest figure is much lower than in other countries (Kolk, 1996, p. 66). The Brazilian Amazon covers some 58 per cent of Brazil's total land area and accounts for around 33 per cent of the world's surviving tropical forests, larger than the combined forested areas of Colombia, Indonesia, Peru and Zaire (Hurrell, 1992, p. 400). Comparatively, the Brazilian Amazon corresponds to half of the European continent. (See Figure 1-1 - The Amazon and Europe: Comparative Map.)
Rainforests have unparalleled biodiversity, containing innumerable herbs, plants and animals, and are a reservoir for genetic material, new crops and medicine. For instance, in the Amazon Basin, more than 1500 species of fish have been described, and scientists estimate that this is no more than half of all the Amazon fish species. This is fifteen times the number of species found in Europe. The Amazon rainforest’s biodiversity accumulates a large list of “the biggest in the world”: the biggest beetle (20 cm); the biggest moth (30 cm), the biggest river shrimp (48 cm), the biggest river fish (3 m), the biggest eagle (97 cm), the biggest river turtle (1.5 m), the smallest monkey (about 12 cm), the biggest spider (28 cm), the biggest flower (2 m) and so on. From its spring to the mouth, the Amazon River has about 6,868 km, about the distance between New York and Berlin (Corrêa, 1997).
Rainforests also perform important regulatory functions for soils, water and climate, protecting vulnerable tropical soils against erosion, stabilizing the local and regional water supply system. Finally, rainforests leads to all kinds of products, ranging from wood to latex, fruits and honey, and provide a living for the local, often indigenous, population. Only the Negro River watershed has more potable water than in all Europe. About 20% of all the fresh water of the planet passes through the Amazon River estuary. Studies at the University of Maryland calculate that the benefits of the Amazon rainforest for the planet about $1,100,000,000,000 (more than the Brazil’s national domestic income) (Corrêa, 1997).

Tropical forests also have a global impact in terms of their role in the global carbon cycle and the effect of deforestation on the global climate. Next to fossil fuel consumption, deforestation by burning is the second most important anthropogenic source of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Of the 8 billion tons of carbon dioxide accumulation per year in the global atmosphere, one estimate suggests that around 2.4 billion tons come from forest burning, or around 30 per cent of the total. Tropical deforestation also releases two other, potent greenhouse gases (methane and nitrous oxide). Although estimates vary, tropical deforestation by burning probably contributes around 10-15 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions (Hurrell, 1992, p. 401).
In less than 30 years, an area larger than France was deforested (see Figure 1-2 — Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon). This means about 600,000 SqKm and most of it occurred in the 1980s. The deforestation slightly decreased in the beginning of the 1990s, but it has increased again in the revitalization of the Brazilian economy. National parks and environmental reservations have been created in the Amazon region since 1970, a total of 124 public protected areas. They cover about 45,000 SqKm, or less than 10% of the Brazilian Amazon (see Figure 1-3 — National Parks and Protected Areas).
In addition Indian reservations count for about 1,000,000 SqKm (although most are still to be officially defined), or about 20% of the Brazilian Amazon (see Figure 1-4 – Indian Reservations in the Amazon). The Indian population in the Amazon is about 170,000, from 210 different ethnic groups. At least 50 tribes have never been contacted by non-Indian society.
Figure 1-4 — Indian Reservations in the Amazon (Corrêa, 1997). (Red areas are Indian reservations.)

Were the Brazilian Amazon region an independent state, it would be the sixth largest country in the world, with one of the lowest population densities on the planet. See below some of the statistics comparing Amazon and the rest of Brazil.

**Table 1.1** — Comparison between Amazon and the Rest of Brazil (Corrêa, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brazil without the Amazon</th>
<th>Amazon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area (SqKm)</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
<td>5,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>138,000,000</td>
<td>19,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>40 hab./SqKm</td>
<td>4 hab./SqKm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita</td>
<td>$4,957</td>
<td>$2,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the Gross National Product</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child mortality</td>
<td>40 dead per 1000</td>
<td>39 dead per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectation</td>
<td>67 years</td>
<td>63 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 2, Earlier Images of the Amazon in the United States, introduces the reader to
selected representations of the Amazon in the América mentalité (see section 1.1. Methodology
and footnote 1). These representations result from the reports of naturalists, adventurers,
travelers and businessmen. Chapter 2 explores also the experience of the former US president
Roosevelt in the charting of an unknown river in Amazon and the Ford Company's frustrated attempt of producing rubber in large scale in the Amazon.

Chapter 3, Thinking Globally, Acting Globally, describes how US NGOs initiated their activities on the Amazon rainforest and points out some strategic motions that showed necessary in their approach to the issue. It also briefly analyses the action of NGOs in international environmental politics and how they built their legitimacy—how they became acceptable and significant actors in international environmental politics. Among different NGOs' strategies, the coalition strategy turned to be the optimal one for US NGOs in Amazon.

Chapter 4, Coalition: A Network Made of Conflict, Diversity and Alliances, discusses the concrete and ideological framework in which the coalition between North American and Brazilian NGOs took place and the areas of conflict and successful cooperation that resulted of such coalition. The representation of the Amazon Indians as "ecologically noble savage" and its efficiency for the environmental movement is analyzed.

Finally, Chapter 5, Case Study: The Mahogany Campaign, presents the "Mahogany Campaign" a case study, with focus on the action of Greenpeace in the campaign. Greenpeace was the main articulator of a coalition among Brazilian NGOs, and the establishment of links between these coalition and US and Northern NGOs. The chapter also analyze the campaign strategies regarding consumer markets and international environmental forums such as the CITES—Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora.
CHAPTER TWO

2 EARLIER IMAGES OF THE AMAZON IN THE UNITED STATES

The presence of the Amazon region in the American mentalité has been shaped by naturalists, travelers, wilderness lovers, and capitalists. This chapter explores earlier and different representations of Amazon that had major impact in the American mentalité. These representations do not exclude or complement each other: they rather compose, even in their contradictions, a complex image. Some elements of these representations—such as the universality of the scientific Amazon—are still present in the American mentalité (see Chapter 3 Thinking Globally, Acting Globally); others have been replaced.

We have avoided representations from the literature and singled personal and historical experiences. However, in these cases, the experience, or the accuracy of its report, is less important than the representation it created.

2.1 The Naturalists

The first tales of the Amazon arrived in the United States in the form of reports by the naturalists in the 18th century. Before that, every information regarding the Amazon was jealously filtered by the Spanish and Portuguese rulers. For Americans who took the time to forget their own problems with the British Crown and looked south, the Amazon region seemed a mysterious forest in the maps, with incredible legends and little more information.

\footnote{The name Amazon is due to a colorful report by the expedition of Orellana (the second-in-command of the Spanish conquistador Pizarro), in 1540, approximately. Orellana affirmed that his expedition was attacked by fierce warrior women, like the mythological Greek Amazons, while they descended the river.}
The first true scientific exploration in the Amazon was launched in 1736 by the French Académie des Sciences, intended to resolve some of Newton's theories regarding the size and shape of the earth. The party included Charles Marie de la Condamine and ten other "natural philosophers." La Condamine's journey differed from earlier ones in that it was sponsored by a scientific institution and in principle "concerned the accumulation of pure knowledge" (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 8). In the same 18th century, the Amazon valley would also be visited by the naturalists Alexander von Humboldt and Aimé Bonpland (1799).

It was in the next century that such enterprises really expanded. In the 19th century, a feverish interest in Brazil, or in Brazil's tropical nature, brought to Amazon several scientific expeditions. A. Reis (1960, p. 95), a Brazilian historian, calls this century "the revolutionary century" for the knowledge of Brazil and the Amazon. In Humboldt's footsteps, came Karl von Martius and Johann von Spix from Bavaria, Hercule Florence, Jean Louis and Elizabeth Agassiz from France, Langsdorff, Gaetano Osulati, Richard Spruce from England, and then Henry Walter Bates, Wallace, Spix and many others. Joseph Ewan, historian from the Missouri Botanical Garden, lists over 600 naturalists of all nationalities who visited and published on the South American continent. Among those, North Americans were a minority until the 20th century. Ewan identifies, as significant 19th American naturalists in the Amazon, only James Orton (1830-1877), William Henry Edwards (1822-1909) and Frank Michler Chapman (1864-1945) (Ewan, 1989, p. 2; 1992, p. 185).

Why were there so few Americans naturalists in the Amazon forest? Perhaps because before the end of the 19th century, the wilderness in America was as juicy, mysterious and unexplored in the civilized mind as any other place. Americans were busy exploring, discovering, praising and collecting their own wilderness. Roderick Nash, an American environmental historian, noted that, by 1850, British noblemen adventurously vacationed in
the wilderness upper Missouri River; forty years later, the wilderness frontier in America was declared over by the historian Frederick Jackson Turner. By the beginning of the 20th century rich Americans such as the former president Theodore Roosevelt explored the Amazon rainforest (see 2.3 The Wilderness Lover). Between the British noblemen in 1850 and Roosevelt in 1910, "the United States changed from an exporter to an importer of wild nature" (Nash, 1982, p. 343).

If not naturalists, Americans were present in Navy-sponsored surveys in the Brazilian forest. In 1849, Lieutenant Lewis Herndon and Midshipmen Lardner Gibbon were requested by the US Navy to explore the entire watershed of the Amazon, with regard to navigability and also to the terrain's possibilities in "the field, the forest, the river or of the mine". They were also required to bring back any specimens or seeds thought to do well on American shores. Herndon's report was published in 1854, arousing great excitement for the description of the riches of the Amazon and the beauty of its women. Samuel Clemens (the American writer Mark Twain) was one of the several young men who, after reading Herndon's report, rode South to New Orleans, hoping to find a ship that would take them to Pará, in the mouth of the Amazon. Fortunately for American literature, Twain could not find any ship going to Brazil then, and decided for becoming a river pilot (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 76).

Most naturalists were also true heirs of Rousseau. Together with the descriptions of plants and seeds, the naturalists' report were plenty of Amazon tribes that "frolic in their innocent beauty, have the leisure to appreciate life, and are attuned to the deeper verities of human existence. Tropical exuberance honors moral perfection," but does not assure civilization (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 11).
2.2 The Traveler

The Rev. James C. Fletcher and his co-writer Rev. D. P. Kidder wrote in 1857 the first book about Brazil that received a wide reception by the American public. In fact, the author wrote in the 6th edition in 1866, that “the favorable reception which five editions of this work have had in the United States, England, and Brazil, indicates a growing interest in the largest and most stable country of South America” (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. vi). The book, called Brazil and the Brazilians, challenges any easy classification. It includes some useful information on the Portuguese idiom, currency, prices and Brazilian etiquette. It is at one history narrative, religious consideration, travel tale and tourist guide.

Fletcher's book has a special interest because of his attempts to make Brazil interesting to his American readers. Brazil’s geographic and natural characteristics were his major enticement. After all, there were so many similarities between the temperate and young United States, and the tropical and young Empire of Brazil (see Figure 2-1 — The Empire of Brazil in 1854).³ Both were, for instance, continentally large and unexplored. “Brazil has neither been explored nor surveyed, and its full extent cannot be accurately ascertained; but, according to the best calculations made in 1845 for the Diccionario Geographico Brasileiro, The Empire contains within its borders 3,004,460 square miles. The United States, buy the latest computations of the Topographical Bureau at Washington, has an area of 3,002,013 square miles.” For the farm-driven Americans, Fletcher has an extra bait: “It is not,” he continues, “[Brazil’s] extent which should attract our attention so much as the fact that no portion of the globe is so available for cultivation and for the sustaining of man” (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, 432). By the time of his 6th edition, Fletcher had visited Brazil six times. Although most of the

³ Brazil became independent from Portugal in 1822.
time he stayed in the capital of the Empire, Rio de Janeiro, he also went to the temperate South, to the North along the coast and the explored part of the Amazon and Central Brazil. It was not a small feat, considering the precarious transport of the middle 19th century.

Figure 2-1 – The Empire of Brazil in 1854 (Fletcher and Kidder, 1866)
In his descriptions, Fletcher paid special attention to forest products, by then an important item of the trade relations between Brazil and US, together with coffee. It was however, the tropical Atlantic rainforest the major source of such products, because its easy access from and to the sea. For instance, the rosewood-tree, today an endangered species from the Atlantic Rainforest, was “cut down, deprived of its branches, and conveyed to market generally by floating it to some seaport-town, whence it is shipped to North America and Europe.... The United States annually purchase of Brazil eighty thousand dollars’ worth of rosewood” (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 437). In his chapter on the Amazon region, however, Fletcher focused not on the actual limited trade or relationship with the US, but on the potential for future trade or relationship. Therefore, Fletcher overcame the prejudice of a common belief that tropical climate were unhealthy for Europeans descendants. By doing so, he also foresaw a future for the Amazon, a vision of the future that would be shared by may American and Brazilian after him. “Some people,” says Fletcher, “who have given much attention to this subject [tropical climate] argue from the nature of the case that the provinces of Pará and Amazonas can never become flourishing rendezvous for Northerners. But, as Brazil differs from all other tropical countries, it may be that the ‘howling wilderness’ of the Amazon will yet smile with Industry and civilization. This was my conviction when in the valley in 1862” (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 580).

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4 The Amazon region, in the mercantilist logic of naming the regions after what they produced, was known as “Região das Drogas do Sertão” (Region of the Drugs of the Wilderness). Fletcher translated sertão for “wilderness,” but this translation should be taken carefully, specially because the change in the meanings of both words, sertão in Brazil, and wilderness in America, in the last century. An original meaning for sertão is “desert place,” the opposite for civilization, and it is probably the Portuguese word with closest meaning to wilderness. It could be applied to the Amazon region or to the Northeast dry countryside. However, by the turn of the century, sertão has been more associated to the specific ecosystems of caatinga and cerrado. Sertanejo is the man of the sertão. The man-desert wilderness is not the best translation for sertão anymore, but the more accurate “backlands,” used by Warren Dean and Hecht and Cockburn (Dean 1987, 58; Hetch and Cockburn 1990, 61). The term implies the populated, uncivilized region.
The Amazon valley, its potential and the wonderful of its creature, greatly impressed Fletcher. Nature in the Amazon is always the realm of the wonderful, be it annoying, such as vampire bats, or magnificent, such as the Victoria Regia (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, pp. 506-539). Notwithstanding the wonderful characteristics, however, for Fletcher this nature as well as its original inhabitants were doomed to disappear to be replaced by Amazon’s real destiny: civilization. This process could already be seen while settler advanced in the territory and entered in conflict with the former habitants of the land. In the civilized territory of Goyas, named after a nearly extinguished tribe, Fletcher noted that “various other tribes still exist within its borders, several of, which cherish a deadly hatred to the people who have invaded their domains and disturbed them in their native haunts. Settlements are often laid waste by the hostile incursions of these Indians.... I do not know that it holds true in Brazil, as in North American, that the bee precedes a few miles the onward march of civilization—advances as the Indian and the wild beast prepare to take their departure—and thus is the pioneer of a better state of things.” The United States, as well as other nations, could play a part in the developing of the future potential of the Amazon. “It would be an interesting expedition, and great good would be accomplished, if the Government of Brazil would consent to send out, with England, France, and the United States, a joint scientific commission, to explore thoroughly the whole district of central Brazil, from Bolivia to Bahia, with particular reference to the navigability of the waters, that here interlace, of those vast rivers which irrigate such a wide extent of territory” (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 454-60).

Although Fletcher was careful enough to underline the need for approval from the Brazilian Government, he was in troubled waters. The control of natural resources was a prerogative to which that the Brazilian Government was extremely sensitive. In the 1850's, the letters of the American Lieutenant Maury, who advocated the opening of the Amazon for
international navigation, had dangerously affected the relations between Brazil and US. As Fletcher witnessed, Americans felt the repercussion in Brazil of the so-called Maury's letters thorough all Brazilian territory. For instance, “outrages committed upon citizens of the United States in the distant portions of the Empire in 1858 very tardily met with redress from the interior magistrates, whose feelings toward 'Norte Americanos' were embittered by the conclusion arrived at after reading the letters of “Tenente Maury” (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 580).

The letters of the Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury (brother-in-law of Lieutenant Herndon, mentioned in 2.1 The Naturalists) deserve a special parenthesis, for its impact on the American public opinion as well as on the Brazilian officers. Maury was a Navy officer, head of the National Observatory in Washington. His letters were motivated by the reports from two different American government sponsored expeditions: Lieutenant Thomas J. Page, USN, in 1853 on the Paraná, Paraguay and the 1851-52 expedition, Lieutenants (USN) Herndon and Gibbon descended the Amazon—one by its Peruvian and the other by its Bolivian tributaries. According to A. Reis (1960, p. 65), Maury depicted Amazon as a generous Eden of natural resources, waiting by “strong races” to carry on its scientific and economic conquest. Such paradise could not be closed to the Humanity by a “Chinese policy.” Reis, Fletcher and Kidder (1866) and Hecht and Cockburn (1990, p. 75) agreed on the impact that Maury’s letters had on the American image of Amazon: all that great potential for wealthy in the Amazon valley and the lack of the right people to develop it. 5 After letters to newspapers and conferences to businessmen in several cities, Maury put all his ideas, advice and suggestions in a book named *The Amazon River and the Atlantic Slopes of South America*, edited in 1853, published also in a
Brazilian edition in the same year. The Brazilian government was understandable cautious and suspicious of such American enthusiasm for the Amazon. The reaction was not different from when the Portugal or Spain ruled the Amazon states: their resources should be protected from the international greed. This nationalist defensive argument would be an integral part of any policy for the Amazon in the future.

The nationalist and somehow xenophobic argument can be found in Teixeira de Macedo, then Brazilian Minister in Washington, when he warned his superior in Brazil on the American intentions toward the Amazon: “The Anglo-American is totally convinced that he should regenerate the whole world, give new form of government to all human society, and rule by his influence all parts of the world, of which he hold today the center, because his position, that dominates the two big oceans, the Gulf of Mexico and the Antilles Sea.... In his work, Lieutenant Maury claims and proves that communications between Pará and New York are easier and shorter than between Pará and Rio de Janeiro, and consequently it is easier to rule the regions served by the Amazonas river from Washington than from the Capital of the Empire of Brazil” (Reis, 1960, p. 80, free translation).

It is easy to infer how such ideas affected the diplomatic relationship between Brazil and USA. The Maury’s letters, however, exemplify correctly how Amazon fitted in the US Manifest Destiny doctrine: the American’s manifest destiny was to bring development to all the regions that, on their turn, had the manifest destiny of being developed. The non-development of the Amazon was a waste that Americans have the right and duty to try to reverse. As we can see in Fletcher’s conclusions about Brazil, although more polite (and diplomatic) than Lt. Maury, he and the other US Navy officers shared the same opinion: the

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5 Another of the plans of Lt. Maury to the Amazon was to sell southern slaves to the Brazilian planters there. “The slaves of the South,” wrote Maury, “are worth 15 hundred million. Their value is increasing at the rate of
capabilities of the Amazon Valley were immense, and the navigation should be open to other nations. Explicitly, Fletcher wrote that “the Amazon should, with proper restrictions, be opened to the commerce of the world. The grandest valley of our globe would, under such conditions, reap, in the course of the next ten years, incalculable benefits” (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 591).

2.3 The Wilderness Lover

In 1913, the conservation champion of the Progressive era, the former American president Theodore Roosevelt, had his own experience in the Amazon Forest. Invited by the Brazilian Government, and under scientific patronage of the American Museum of Natural History, he and his party joined an expedition to chart the course of an unknown river, a tributary of the Amazon River basin. The two-month expedition, named Roosevelt-Rondon Scientific Expedition, resulted in a magnificent collection of some 2,500 birds, 500 mammals and several score of reptiles. Many of these were previously unknown to science, and most were new to the museum’s collection. Results also included a never well recovered wound for Roosevelt, a frustrated hunting experience, and an exciting report by Roosevelt on his Through the Brazilian Wilderness, published in 1914.

Roosevelt’s party included himself, George K. Cherrie, Leo E. Miller and Anthony Fiala (three expert naturalist from the American Museum of natural History), and Roosevelt’s son Kermit Roosevelt. Their travel to the Brazilian wilderness would be initially a pure adventure to collect new specimens for the Museum, and to provide some hunting opportunities to a depressed T. Roosevelt, after the failure of his 1912 presidential bid. Instead,

30 or 40 million a year. It is the industrial capital of the South. Did ever a people consent to sink so much industrial capital by emancipation or any other voluntary act?" (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 74).
it was turned in an exploratory expedition when the Brazilian Government requested Colonel Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon to escort the former president. Rondon defined a new goal for the expedition: to chart the course of 629-mile-long river unknown to cartographers, from the River Paraná, in Mato Grosso, to the River Amazonas. The river was called Rio da Dúvida (River of Doubt, see Figure 2-2 — Theodore Roosevelt River, According to Roosevelt Logs.), as all rivers are before their charting, and it was renamed Roosevelt River after the expedition. Roosevelt described Rondon as “an officer and a gentleman, also a particularly hardy and competent explorer, a good field naturalist and scientific man, a student and a philosopher.” Rondon was also probably the man who best knew the extended Brazilian territory by that time. For 20 years, before he met Roosevelt, he had explored the Brazilian interior, recorded its natural history, built telegraph lines and peacefully pacified primitive tribes (Williams, 1986, p. 36).

The expedition was not like any exciting hunting vacation or an well-organized safari. Roosevelt faced “piranhas, jaguars, crocodile and a catalog of nasty insect life. He had emerged from the jungle wracked by fever, weakened by severe malnutrition, hollow-eyed from exhaustion and with a tube draining pus from an abscessed leg. Consummate naturalist and compulsive adventurer, T.R. had loved every minute of it” (Williams, 1986, p. 36).

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6 A small tributary of this river was named after Kermit Roosevelt.

7 Rondon was also one of the true heroes of the Brazilian History—and there is not a single shade of irony on the use of the word "hero." His mother was from the tribes Terena e Bororo; his father had mixed origins, Portuguese and Guará. An ardent disciple of the French philosopher August Comte, Rondon was best known for his activities as protector of the Brazilian Indian peoples. He actually succeeded into reverse the Brazilian Government’s informal support to the fights against the Indians. Instead, Rondon motioned the government to establish the Indian Protective Service, naming the colonel its director. His one ironclad order to his subordinates—"Die if you must, but never kill."—became the official motto of the service, and its men lived and literally died by it. He received the Livingstone Award in 1914, by the New York Geography Society. In 1913 the International Council of the Races, meeting in London, considered Rondon’s accomplishment an example to be followed for the honor of the universal civilization (Ribeiro, 1958/1998).
Figure 2-2 — Theodore Roosevelt River, According to Roosevelt Logs. (Roosevelt, 1955).
Roosevelt may have loved it, but the expedition was different from his expectations. For several reasons, hunting was not an easy activity during the trip. First, nobody knew how long was the river, and how long it would take to reach any civilized area to get new provisions. Therefore, time was a critical issue, and could not be wasted in leisure hunting. Second, the expedition was carried on during the rainy season. On the one hand, it provided a better speed down the river; on the other hand, animals did not need to stay close to the river. After almost one month in the river, Roosevelt noted: “So far the game, fish, and fruit had been too scarce to be an element of weight in our food-supply. In an exploring trip like ours, through a difficult and utterly unknown country, especially if densely forested, there is little time to halt, and game cannot be counted on. It is only in lands like our own West thirty years ago, like South Africa in the middle of the last century, like East Africa today that game can be made the chief food-supply” (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 370). The Roosevelt’s comparisons showed Amazon as a different wilderness from others. There is no big game, little hunting. The real foes are the insects, the small and far from noble carregadoras ants and borrachudos mosquitoes. “The mammals were a great contrast to what I had seen in Africa. Africa is the country for great game. There is nothing like that in South America. The animals in South America of interest to the naturalist more than to the person who is traveling through the country and takes the ordinary layman’s point of view” (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 325). Third, the obstacles during the trip—not at all uncommon for similar expeditions—stripped Roosevelt little by little of most of his material assurances from civilization. His clothes (including underwear) were mostly eaten by ants; his books—“the last two volumes of Gibbon, they plays of Sophocles, Moore’s Utopia, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus” (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 304)—were abandoned in the forest when the party had to redistribute the cargo among the remaining canoes.
However, it was exactly this direct and non-mediated experience with wilderness that Roosevelt sought. Theodore Roosevelt was part of the American romantic tradition that praises the US wilderness almost in a funerary eulogy. The frontier was gone, and it was mourned by its admirers, at the same time that civilization and progress were considered the biggest achievements of humanity. In the vision of James Fenimore Cooper, the wilderness writer of *Prairie* and another member of this tradition, “the elimination of wilderness was tragic, but it was a necessary tragedy; civilization was the greater good” (Nash, 1982, p. 77).

Roosevelt went further. For him, the most valuable of the goods was not civilization, or wilderness, but the virile qualities, the strength of character that the continuous contact with the wilderness—and its conquest—offered to the American people. The greatness of the American civilization was a direct result of the greatness of this frontiersmen’s *virtù*. “Under the hard conditions of life in the wilderness,’ Roosevelt wrote, those who migrated to the New World ‘lost all remembrance of Europe’ and became new men ‘in dress, in costumes, and in mode of life.’ He too realized that by the 1890’s ‘the frontier had come to an end; it had vanished.’ This alarmed Roosevelt chiefly because of its anticipated effect on national virility and greatness” (Nash, 1982, p. 149). This *virtù* is lost when the civilization concludes its task, and its children mourn the loss. The American historian Roderick Nash quotes the 19th century historian Francis Parkman’ claims that “[c]ivilization had a destroying as well as a creating power. Among its casualties were the Indian, the buffalo, and the frontiersman, ‘a class of men… so remarkable both in their virtues and their faults that few will see their extinction without regret” (Nash, 1982, p. 99). Roosevelt shared this mourning and feared the effect of

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8 Frederick Jackson Turner proposed the “frontier thesis,” a landmark in the American historiography, in 1893. The frontier thesis explained the American history as a series of westward waves that formed the American national character. When a report in the 1890 census stated that the western land of opportunity had been filled up, and the frontier had come to an end, Turner feared for the future of the United States and its national character (Opie, 1998, p. 156).
the loss of the frontiersman in the American character. The continuous contact with
wilderness was an important way to keep alive in the complex American civilization “the
fundamental frontier virtues” (Nash, 1982, p. 150).

Despite the difference in the game and glory, Roosevelt saw the same virtues in his
comrades of expedition. He praised “the way the work was done, at the good-will, the
endurance, and the bull-like strength of the camaradas, and at the intelligence and the unwearied
efforts of their commanders.” How pitiful was the “ignorance of those who do not realize the
energy and the power that are so often possessed by, and that may be so readily developed in,
the men of the tropics.” His pity (and disdain) was also extended to those who experienced the
false wilderness and therefore did not develop the virile characteristics that only the wild could
offer. “Another subject of perpetual wonder is the attitude of certain men who stay at home,
and still more the attitude of certain men who travel under easy conditions, and who belittle
the achievements of the real explorers of, the real adventurers in, the great wilderness.... [T]he
work of the genuine explorer and wilderness wanderer is fraught with fatigue, hardship and
danger” (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 344). Like Fletcher, Roosevelt foresaw a glorious
civilization in the South Amazon: “Here the soil was fertile; it will be a fine site for a coffee
plantation when this region is open to settlement.”9 In fact, to do otherwise would be a waste,
a sin against the land hungry humanity. “Such a rich and fertile land cannot be permitted to
remain idle, to lie as a tenantless wilderness, while there are such teeming swarms of human
beings in the overcrowded, overpeopled countries of the Old World.” Technology and
progress would turn what were then obstacles in clear benefits for a healthy and wealthy

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9 Most of the soil in Amazon is poor and dependent from the ecosystems. Deforestation and agriculture have
eroded almost completely the topsoil of some areas. However, other areas in Mato Grosso, close to Roosevelt’
 itinerary, are rich. I ignore whether this observation is referred to one of these fertile areas, or if it was an
optimistic mistake by Roosevelt.
society. "The very rapids and waterfalls which now make the navigation of the river so difficult and dangerous would drive electric trolleys up and down its whole length and far out on either side, and run mills and factories, and lighten the labor on farms. With the incoming of settlement and with the steady growth of knowledge how to fight and control tropical diseases, fear of danger to health would vanish" (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 372).

Roosevelt, however, did not envy those who would live on the tamed land, and it is not their experience that he coveted. "A land like this is a hard land for the first explorers, and perhaps for their immediate followers, but not for the people who come after them." It is not the conquered land as much as the conquest of the land that he praised. The virtù belongs to the "first explorers" (Roosevelt, 1914/1955, p. 372).

2.4 The Capitalist

Henry Ford never went in person to Amazon. His presence was, however, almost as real as the Roosevelt river, in the abandoned skeleton of the cities of Fordlândia and Belterra (see Figure 2-3 – Rubber Tree Occurrence Range). From 1927 to 1945, the Ford company carried on a social and economic experience by the margins of the rivers Amazonas and Tapajós, unsuccessfully trying to turn the forest into an organized and efficiency center of production of rubber.

Rubber gathering is an old activity to the Amazon people and a traditional item in the Brazil-US commercial relations. In 1866 Fletcher described the process of production of the rubber by Indians. "The use of the caoutchouc or gum-elastic," Fletcher wrote, "was learned from the Omaguas,—a tribe of Brazilian Indians. These savages used in the form of bottles and syringes: (hence the name syringe-tree)." Seringueira is the Portuguese name for the rubber tree,
or *Hevea brasiliensis*. By 1800 Belém was exporting rubber shoes to New England, with this trade reaching 450.00 by 1839 (Fletcher & Kidder, 1866, p. 553)\(^\text{10}\).

The Ford adventure began when rubber world prices skyrocketed by 1922, when the world glut of rubber was seriously afflicting even the Southeast Asian plantations. The US Department of Agriculture carried out research in the Amazon countries, trying to find alternatives to the Asian rubber. Equally, Henry Ford looked for his own solution that would give him autonomy for his tire factories and a social laboratory in the middle of Amazon.

\(^{10}\) Rubber was also the Brazilian nationalists' symbol for the world greedy eyes on the Amazon. Brazil had in the 19th century the monopoly of rubber until a British adventurer secretly (and illegally) took seedling of *Hevea* to the Kew Botanical Garden, in London. These seedlings were the origin of the British rubber tree plantations in Malaysia and the end of the Brazilian monopoly of rubber (Dean, 1987, p. 47).
In 1927, Ford bought from the Government of Pará two and a half million acres, stretched for seventy-five miles along the east bank of the Tapajós, south of Santarém.

Different from Roosevelt, Ford did not revel in the process of conquest of the wilderness. His idea of virtù was on the ordered, union-free and almost aseptic production facility he created in Brazil. The technological city of Fordlândia was not born in the Amazon: it was transported directly from Dearborn to the Tapajós. It is a modernity cluster in the wilderness. “In December 1928, a company-owned freighter deposited at Fordlândia the components of an entire plantation nucleus, from diesel engines to nails and bolts. The American staff and their Brazilian workers immediately set to work to construct a small city, soon to be the third largest in the Amazon, complete with hospital, schools, cinema, water supply, electricity, docks, machine shops and warehouses. Visitors never failed to marvel at this superb infrastructure, unmatchable for a thousand miles in any direction. The neatly aligned wooden bungalows, bunkhouses, general stores, and mess halls elicited praise from junketing Brazilian officials and went far to extract Ford from his early political difficulties” (Dean, 1987, p. 73).

It was to be an enterprise in the Ford mold. Ford’s industries were characterized by tight linkages with suppliers and rigorous control over labor. Fordlândia was to be a southern extension of the Rouge Plant in Detroit, with its integrated system of production. “In this perspective, the requirements of success were organization, capital and work disciplines of the advanced industrial world” (Hecht & Cockburn, 1990, p. 95).

Ford’s idea was to start everything from scratch, out of nothing, out of the a-historical forest. And his failure is due in a great degree to the fact that the forest was none of these. Instead, the forest was located in a political context, and Ford had to deal with jealous and petty local disputes. The political context also included the work force in the Amazon, with its own history and culture. They did not fit in Ford’s ordered scheme. Ford tried to give to the
worker an orderly and modern environment: health and dental care, wages twofold higher than in any other place in the Amazon, new and clean houses, schools and even soccer fields. The workers, however, were used to a more personal (even if exploiting) relationship with the *patrão* (patron), who was at once bossman, godfather and protector. Capitalist work relations were a bigger burden to them than all the debt servitude that was so common in the Amazon. Riot and grudges against management became common, some caused by professional provocateurs, others by sheer cultural gap.11 Facing these problems, management in Fordlândia wondered whether would be possible to import people, as the city itself was imported. The forest was not the problem, they thought, but the forest people, or the lack of forest people available to work in capitalist terms. Immigration was a wise option: "the Government of Pará and the federal government [were ready] to import Asian labor if it should happen that enough workers could not be found in the Amazon and the Brazilian Northeast." LaRue, one of the first advocates of the large-scale plantation of rubber in the Amazon, wrote to the Firestone company in 1924: "I know you will be permitted to import Chinese. A million Chinese in the rubber sections of Brazil would be a godsend to that country. And after Brazil saw what wonderful development came from the Chinese labor, that nation wouldn't ask expatriation of the coolies" (Dean, 1987, p. 83).

Not only the workers did not fit Ford's blueprint, but the forest had also its own environmental requirements. In its natural ecosystem, the Hevea (rubber tree) has a biota that lives out of the tree. That means that, when planted in close sequence, in a line of production typical of industrial exploitation, the rubber tree is highly vulnerable to a number of blights and diseases. These diseases do not exist in Asia, where the Hevea is an exotic species, and this is

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11 The American historian Galey describes a riot caused by the cafeteria system, where the workers were required to help themselves. "I am worker, not a waiter," reportedly complained one of the workers, and what followed destroyed the whole cafeteria (Galey, 1979, p. 277).
the major cause of success of the Malaysian plantations. Ford also planned to process the lumber from the cleared forest as a second source of funds for Fordlândia, with no better results than in the rubber plantation. To the dismay of the Ford’s managers, tropical hardwood did not occur in clusters of the same specie, making commercially impossible a systematic exploitation of the resource (Galey, 1989, p. 273).

The ecological problems succeeded to each other as in a curse. At Fordlândia, the feared caterpillars that attacked the plantations were temporary dominated by their natural enemy, the sauva ant. The ants, then, turned their attention to the trees. White root disease and canker attacked the tree roots. “Jungle underbrush also hindered tree growth and maintenance, so cover crops were planted to retard the undergrowth. These cover crops soon dried up in the Amazonian dry season and created a fire hazard. In the rainy season the cover crops absorbed water and plant foods that might ordinarily have promoted the growth of the rubber trees. By 1933 Ford officials realized the Detroit engineering approach to rubber planting was hopeless” (Galey, 1979, p. 274). These problems had not been foreseen by Ford’s staff, who lacked of expert knowledge on the region. A factory is a factory anywhere; why would not a rubber tree plantation be the same everywhere? Even better, in the natural area of occurrence of the rubber tree? The high technology of the city contrasted with the total ignorance of the staff on the basics of the business. “For the first five years of its existence, Fordlândia had not one resident on its staff, or even available as a consultant, with scientific training in tropical agriculture or practical experience in rubber planting” (Dean, 1987, p. 75).

A radical solution was tried in 1934, when the plant pathologist James Weir was in charge of the plantation: the complete transference of the experiment. “Modernity works,” he seemed to say, “we are just in the wrong spot.” In 4 May 1934, “a 281,500 hectare tract of the Fordlândia concession was traded for another of equal size at Belterra. The sawmill and the
machine shop began to replicate the warehouses, dock, housing, schools, hospital and the like of Fordlândia" (Dean, 1987, p. 77). New seedlings were imported from Asia, in the expectation that they would resist better to the blight, and then cloned. A new area was cleared, and the problems were the same. “After thirteen years, an investment of almost $10.5 million, and the planting of 3.650.000 rubber tress, there was still almost nothing ready to tap!” (Dean, 1987, p. 84). By the 1940s, the Ford company had lost all its interest for Fordlândia, after a brief revival caused by the demand of rubber because the World War II. In 1945, Belterra was sold to the Brazilian government for $500,000, less than 5% of the total investment. In eighteen years, the plantations had failed to produce any rubber for large-scale commercial use (Galey, 1979, p. 283).

2.5 Conclusion

The Amazon experiences of the naturalists, as well as Fletcher, Maury, Roosevelt and Ford, coexist with many others that helped to form the earlier representations of the Amazon in the American mentalité. Not less important is the idea of “Green Hell” that is associated to the tropical rainforest in general, be it Asian, African or American. The Green Hell, the dark and betraying jungle, was better explored in the literature, for instance by Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, or the Latin-American writers of the first half of the 20th century, who wrote the “jungle novels” (“la novela de la selva”) (Marcone, 1997, par. 3). However, these experiences point out to some elements, sometimes contradictorily, that would characterize the relationship of the North Americans with the Amazon. These elements are, for instance, the “perception of divine nature as virgin, unmodified by human action, and thus meet for virtuous contemplation,” the role of science in the future of the Amazon, and/or the role of the Amazon in the future of the science, “inspired by a view of the Amazon as an enormous,
unsullied laboratory for the scientific contemplation and classification of nature;” the plan and/or role of countries other than Brazil in the future of the Amazon; the nationalistic reaction to these plans; the control of the resource of the Amazon. Each of these representations has also implied a project for the Amazon.

At the same time, these representations have in common the fact that they projected upon the Amazon their own ideas on what the region is or should be. These impositions “have exacted a heavy price: a refusal to permit the Amazon to tell its own story” (Hecht & Cockbuen, 1990, p. 15). The American mentalité has thus representations of the Amazon that greatly disregarded the plans or conceptions that the Amazonians may have about themselves. In the next chapter, we hope to show a change in this mentalité or, at least, a potential for change.
CHAPTER THREE

3 THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING GLOBALLY

Since the first naturalists’ reports on the Amazon region reached the United States, Americans have seen it successively as the jungle, the wilderness, the land of underutilized resources, the future center of a civilization. Yet on October 15, 1997, a New York Times editorial complained that “[t]he issue that most Americans identify with Brazil—the destruction of the Amazon rainforest—did not occupy a prominent role in the talks between President Clinton and Brazil’s President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.” This is far distant from the earlier images seen in the previous chapter. The destruction of the Amazon rainforest is the main association with Brazil, not its scientific or bizarre curiosities, nor the wasted resources. Moreover, the New York Times goes on by saying that “Brazil, like the United States and Asia’s forested nations, must abandon the view that the rain forest is only a commodity to be exploited for private gain” (“A Rain Forest Imperiled,” 1997). If not only a commodity, what does the New York Times suggest that the forest is now?

This shift from dangerous “jungle” to fragile or threatened “rainforest” in the American mentalité is due in large part to the influence of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Though relatively new in the world environmental political arena, NGOs have been major actors in the definition of US policies for tropical rainforests (Mohd & Laarman, 1994). In this chapter I analyze how US NGOs initiated their activities on the

12 The impact of this shift can be noted in the following comic message that has circulated in the Internet:

"Rainforest?! When the hell did it become the rainforest? When I was a little kid it was called the jungle, a place where it’s dark and scary and snakes are crawling everywhere and there’s large spiders that bite you and, if you don’t find an antidote for its poison in five minutes, your heart will explode. Now it’s the rainforest, a happy place of butterflies with smiling little elves running around." (Cantu, 1998, par. 2). More in the academic realm, Candace Slater has exploited the issue and the political effects of such shift in the American imaginary. (Slater, 1995).
Amazon rainforest and to point out some strategic actions in their approach to the issue. Most of the data on the activities of the US NGOs was obtained in structured interviews (see 4.1 Oral history/Structured Interviews).

3.1 Non Governmental Organizations: A New Actor in the Block

Most authors agree that it is difficult to define a non-governmental organization (Kolk, 1996, p. 52; Mohd & Laarman, 1994, p. 320; Anello, 1991, p. 5). The term defines the organizations negatively by expressing what it is not (governmental), instead of defining what it is. The wide range of tasks carried on by an NGO also prevents us from a definition by activities. Currently, NGOs sponsor research, lobby in the congress, implement field and educational projects, organize conferences and are active in many other areas.

For several decades, the NGO concept has been used in the framework of the United Nations to refer to the list of identified organizations with certain rights within the Economic and Social Council (Kolk, 1996, p. 52). This is, however, a rather arbitrary selection that does not include many relevant organizations. On the other hand, some authors include in their studies business organizations, such as the American Plywood Association or the Woodworkers Alliance for Rainforest Protection. Both organizations have a clear timber trade associations agenda but are, formally, non-governmental organizations (Mohd & Laarman, 1994). Consensus appears to have been reached on the use of NGOs in the sense of non-profit organization—which could still include the business organizations which operate under the guise of NGOs. In this thesis, environmental NGOs refer exclusively to non-profit organizations that align themselves within the environmental movement.

Their unclear definition notwithstanding, non-governmental organizations are a notable force of the last quarter of this century. When compared with other organizations,
their growth has been unparalleled. For instance, whereas “between 1909 and 1988, intergovernmental organizations grew from thirty-seven to 309, non-governmental organizations grew from 179 to 4,518…. In fact, almost all environmental NGOs, networks, and coalitions were started in 1980s” (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 1). Yet another indicator of growing NGO prominence is the organizational growth which many individual NGOs, especially some of the more prominent Northern groups, have experienced since the early 1980s. Just to quote some examples relevant to this study, from 1985 to 1990, membership in Greenpeace increased from 1.4 million to 6.75 million and annual revenues went from $24 million to some $100 million. Greenpeace had five foreign affiliates in 1979, while in 1992 it had offices in twenty-four countries worldwide. The Nature Conservancy, founded in 1951, began its international programs in 1974 but it was not until 1987 that a splinter group formed Conservation International; by 1991 it had twenty NGO partners in sixteen Latin American countries, and a budget of $10.9 million. The Sierra Club increased its membership from 346,000 in 1983 to 560,000 in 1990 and has an annual budget of $35 million. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), founded in 1972 with 6,000 members, now has 170,000 and an annual budget of $16 million. Both the Sierra Club and the NRDC expanded their international programs in the 1980s and early 1990s (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 3).

UNCED—the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 1992—was a major landmark in the history of NGOs in international environmental forums. By then the relevance of the NGOs in international forums was already recognized, although its role was yet in dispute. Governments and intergovernmental

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13 According to well-accepted terminology, I use “Northern” to denote industrialized countries from North America and Western Europe plus Japan, Australia and New Zealand. “Southern” refers to those less industrialized countries formerly known as the Third World and occupying much of Latin America, Africa and Asia.
organizations intended to have NGOs just as providers of data and expertise [science], as information disseminators, and as legitimating agents. On the other hand, many NGOs were not ready to be limited to this role and wanted to use UNCED to bring about fundamental change in world development. "As a result, an ongoing bargain occurred in UNCED whereby states conceded credit to some NGOs for promoting environmental and development values and, in return, gave them visibility, prominence, and sometimes even financial and logistical support. Consequently, in organizing themselves around UNCED, some NGOs acquired a certain autonomy from traditional politics and developed a new relationship with the emerging international environment and development establishment" (Finger, 1994a, p. 187).

3.2 The Amazon Forest Enters the US NGOs' Agenda

The environmental issue started to be internationalized in the mid-1980s, when it became the subject of international controversies. Although the environment had been considered at the international level before, as, for instance, in the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm 1972, this largely involved deliberation in international forums, exchange of scientific information, and concrete action in the area of nature conservation (Kolk, 1996, p. 19).

It was also during the 1980s that the Amazon gained international attention. Kolk (1996) considers that "the gradual shift of focus from local to global features of rainforest destruction and from separate elements to the ecosystem as a whole explain the rising significance of the Amazon." In other words, the disastrous consequences of widespread logging of the rainforest area in other regions of the world for export purposes, especially their rapid decimation, even increased the specificity of the Amazon as the largest and reasonable healthy rainforest in the planet. Regarding the Brazilian Amazon in particular, a sudden
upsurge of public interest in the region in 1988 was brought about by the publication of alarming deforestation figures; global media coverage of burning rainforests; the subsequent association of rainforest destruction with global warming; and the assassination of the rubber tapper Chico Mendes, the president of the National Council of the Rubber Tappers and a longtime advocate for the preservation of the Amazon rainforest for extrativist use \(^{14}\) (Kolk, 1996, p. 19).

However, if 1988 is a landmark for public interest in the Amazon rainforest, US NGOs had been active in the region since 1983, through a campaign against Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). To initiate this process were Barbara Bramble, Bruce Rich and Brent Blackwelder, respectively the international program officers then recently appointed to the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Environmental Policy Institute (EPI, the predecessor of Friends of the Earth-US, FoE). These officers tried to find ways to deal with the international dimension of the environment understandable for a wider public. Until then, US NGOs had generally restricted their activities to domestic issues.

Bramble, Rich and Blackwelder were all part of the Green Group or Group of Ten, a formal committee established in 1983, made up of the heads of twenty of the major NGOs in the US, for planning and co-ordination of major initiatives. “It was this committee that agreed to a joint media campaign on six major environmental issues (global warming, biological diversity, population, ocean pollution, Eastern Europe, and global economic bargaining) at the group of seven Economic Summit in Houston in 1990” (Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 319).

\(^{14}\) Extractive reserves are protected areas in which forests would be preserved for local people to extract non-timber products, such as rubber, Brazil nuts, roots and other non-timber products. Occasionally and under the agreement of the community, timber may be extracted for local use.
A campaign against the MDBs which centered on the fate of the local population and their natural environment was launched, and it turned out to be an excellent approach to attract public attention to international issues. The NGOs involved selected the case studies on the basis of personal contacts with Southern NGOs or with US activist who knew about a particular project. In this way, ongoing and emerging protests in Brazil were linked to and strengthened by international actions (which, in their turn, were far more convincing and effective as a result of these connections). The campaign against the multilateral development banks, which US environmental NGOs initiated in 1983, brought about an international coalition of Northern and Southern organizations. In Brazil the protests against the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank built on the opposition to military dictatorship, uniting Indians, environmentalists and rural activists, particularly rubber tappers. Due to these successful actions in particular, international knowledge of and concern over the fate of the inhabitants of the rainforest increased (Kolk, 1996, p. 78).

Stephen Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), currently officer for the EDF International Program, considers that the campaign approach was original at that time. The US was then (and now) the larger single source of funds for the World Bank. The strategy of the campaign was to require more environmental responsibility for US money that went to the World Bank. “We singled out case studies,” says Schwartzman, “demanding a broader concept of sustainability. In that period Brazil had three big projects waiting for funds in the World Bank, with little participation of the local NGOs at all. We tried to underline the importance of the participation of the local NGOs, as local constituencies, and this was a big
success. Our partner then was the FASE, one of the oldest organizations working in Amazon, besides IBASE and Rede Brazil.”

Besides the mainstream US environmental organizations, such as NWF, EDF, Sierra Club, FoE, NRDC, the campaign formed coalition of forces also with human rights organizations in Washington, such as Survival. Survival International is an organization dedicated to indigenous people in all the world and it had already links with local organizations in Brazil. Other activists in the human rights field understood how this alliance of environmental and human rights organizations could be fruitful and adapted in part their agendas to encompass both environmental and social needs. In fact, in the NGOs’ discourse, equity was one of the most important philosophical matrixes for sustainability (S. Schwartzman, phone interview, October 17, 1997; Acselrad & Sedrez, 1995).

Imazon (the Man and Environment Institute of the Amazon), the National Council of Rubber Tappers, and the Institute for Amazon Studies would be major partners for EDF and NWF from 1985 on. The Brazilian organizations demanded that the Brazilian government support extractive reserves—areas in which forests would be preserved for local people to extract non-timber products, such as rubber and Brazil nuts—as an alternative to government-aided development projects that threatened to destroy tropical forests. This proposal was quickly incorporated by the US organizations in their negotiations with the World Bank (Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 332).

According to Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), “this alliance was a landmark for the environmental movement in the US. Traditional conservationist movements began to pay attention to the relationship between social and environmental problems, and to

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15 IBASE—Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses—and Rede Brazil are two important development Brazilian NGOs, with large tradition in the Brazilian social movement.
make deeper criticism to development models. For instance, in 1985 organizations such as the Sierra Club had no contact with grassroots movements. Nowadays this exchange is a common place.” Schwartzman suggests a causal link between the international campaign against the MDBs, that took into account the social dimensions of environmental issues, with more receptiveness by the mainstream environmental organization to environmental justice concepts within the US. Although I cannot confirm such causal link, there is no doubt that both tendencies (coalitions with Southern grassroots and coalitions with American grassroots) were parallels, with a slight precedence for the former.

Some authors consider the MDB (“50 years is enough!”) campaign a failure. According to K. Conca (1993, p. 313), a researcher on world politics, “the campaign succeeded in forcing the Bank to divert a small percentage of its lending into environmental-protection projects, and to rein in some of its most environmentally destructive lending activities. But the campaign failed in its larger effort to challenge the concept of project-based development lending and the ends toward which such lending is directed.”

Notwithstanding its specific achievements and failures, the campaign set a pattern for the relationship of the US NGOs regarding the Amazon rainforest. This pattern included not only concern for the fate of the forest and its biodiversity, but also concern for the forest people and proposals for alternative development; above all, this pattern included the establishment of coalitions with Southern organizations.

Such a pattern was noticed in the reviewed literature. In 1992-93, Mohd and Laarman (1994, pp. 321-324) surveyed the tactics and targets of US NGOs regarding rainforest. According to the authors, environmental “NGOs indicated that they are concerned not only with the broad issue of protecting rainforest biodiversity, but also inter alia with rights of indigenous people, roles of the international institutions in tropical deforestation, and linkages
between the tropical timber trade and deforestation... Nearly one in every two citizen NGOs mentioned that the fight for the rights of indigenous peoples is a prime concern”. Almost all showed preference for “outside tactics,” as defined by the author, which include “entering into coalitions, working with media, protest and demonstrations, grassroots lobbying viewpoints.”

However, among all the organizations in the United States, only a small subset has been involved in global environmental problems, although that number has risen remarkably in the last few years. These organizations with a global agenda are usually of three general types: “first the large, general membership organizations, with broad environmental interests but focused primarily on domestic environmental issues; second, organizations whose primary orientation is toward international issues and which are part of a larger international network of affiliated organizations; third, ‘think tank’ organizations without large membership whose primary influence comes through research, publishing, and/or legal work” (Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 316).

I selected five of the most significant US NGOs concerned with the Amazon rainforest among a list of 24 organization from Mohd and Laarman’s study: Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, Rainforest Action Network, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The former two are not considered “activist” NGOs by Mohd and Laarman’s study, while the latter three are. In the next few pages, I intend to offer a brief chronology of the involvement of each of them with the Amazon rainforest. In the Bramble and Porter’s taxonomy, Sierra Club fits in the first category; Rainforest Action Network, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace fit in the second; and Environmental Defense Fund could fit in the third, as a legal think tank.
The coalition strategy is analyzed in more detail in the next chapter. (A brief consideration on its fundamental role for assuring legitimacy of action for US NGOs in the South follows in the section 3.3 Legitimacy: from Local to Global).

### 3.2.1 Sierra Club

The US environmental icon John Muir founded the Sierra Club in 1892. It is in many senses the most traditional of the American environmental organizations. Its journal, Sierra, promotes ecotourism, conservation, hints for climbing and camping in the “wilderness” and updates on the US environmental policy.

Though the Sierra Club deals mainly with domestic environmental issue, it first issued a policy guideline for tropical rainforest on January 12 1974, only two years after the UN Conference of Stockholm. The Sierra Club policy claimed that “more areas to [sic] tropical forest need to be set aside permanently as parks and reserves. The need for these reserves for recreational, scientific or educational use is clear and urgent.” A final article demanded “that the culture and human rights of primitive [sic] native peoples living in the rainforests of the world must be recognized in any planning program.” There is no suggestion, however, on how to harmonize both demands: parks and reserves on one side and cultural and human rights of indigenous people on the other (Sierra Club, 1994, par. 2-8).

In 1980 the Sierra Club was part of the U.S environmental communities Tropical Forest Working Group. Due to this activity, it included an amendment to its Rainforest policy on November 15, 1980. In this amendment, the Sierra Club “recognizes that there is dramatic deterioration of the world’s tropical rainforest resource from a multitude of causes and that, at the current rate of loss, projections indicate that by the year 2000 [sic] most of the accessible tropical forests of the world will disappear. The Sierra Club maintains that existing institutional
measures to control tropical deforestation are insufficient to secure vital reservoirs of genetic
diversity or to prevent severe deterioration in watershed quality throughout the developing
countries of the tropics.” The focus was therefore on the ecological effects of the destruction
of the rainforest. In the same amendment, the Sierra Club urged US and Canada to assume
their responsibility in the quest for mitigation of the tropical deforestation, due “to their
leadership in science and technology” (Sierra, 1994, par. 3).

Despite this policy, Sierra Club didn’t have a really active campaign on tropical
rainforest until 1983, when it took part on the MDB campaign. The Sierra journal dedicated
no more than one article per year to tropical rainforest, from 1978 to 1985. In 1988 Sierra
announced the launching of its tropical rainforest campaign. The campaign meant basically the
support of initiatives of other organizations with larger basis in Amazon, such as EDF and
NRDC, especially in the MDB campaign. The Sierra Club website claims that, as part of this
campaign, in 1989 “the Sierra Club presses World Bank to withdraw $500 million loan to
Brazil, which kills plans to build 147 dams and flood large areas of Amazon” (Sierra, 1996, par.
5). I couldn’t find any reference to such plans.

From 1985 to 1995 there is a slight increase of articles on rainforest in the Sierra
Journal (about two to three per year, and a total of four articles in 1992). There is no evidence
that the campaign was still active in 1997. On the other hand, several pages in the Sierra Club
website in 1998 are dedicated to “Human Rights and Environment,” with special notes
regarding the activist Chico Mendes, the National Council of Rubber Tapper and the Kayapós,
one of the largest Amazonian tribe.
3.2.2 Environmental Defense Fund

The Environmental Defense Fund was founded in 1967 by a “coalition of Long Island scientists from the Brookhaven National Laboratory, faculty from the State University of New York at Stony Brook, and local citizens concerned about groundwater pollution, dump sites, wildlife habitat protection, and uncontrolled development” (Opie, 1998, p. 423).

EDF’s involvement with Amazon started in 1993, with the campaign against Multilateral Development Banks, which is still the bulk of its International Program. The strategy of coalition has been part of the history of the EDF, so it was natural that it would try to create coalitions also in its international program. The selection of Stephen Schwartzman to coordinate the International Program in 1988 was part of this policy. Schwartzman had lived in Brazil for two years, working with Brazilian NGOs on Indian rights and human rights international networks. For his research for a Ph.D. in Anthropology by the University of Chicago, in 1983 he lived with the Panará Indians, in Mato Grosso, Brazil. His background warranted him easy access to Brazilian NGOs.

EDF activities include the release of in-depth studies on the Amazon and press releases on news from Amazon; lobbying in US and international forums, such as the World Bank; consultant services to local NGOs and managing the Chico Mendes Fund. The Fund was created soon after the murder of the Brazilian activist and its resources are transferred to the National Council of Rubber Tappers in Brazil, founded by Mendes.

EDF was one of the first organizations to open the US NGOs for Brazilian activists. According to Schwartzman (phone interview, 1997, October 17), EDF “started the contact with Chico Mendes with US NGOs.” The goal then was not only to enlarge the coalition of US NGOs, but also to enlarge the basis of support for environmental issues in Brazil. “In 1987, when we brought him here, my major expectation was that the rubber tappers would be
a point of contact with the Unions and the worker movement, with the small farmers. We thought that it could be an opening for the worker unions to environmental issues.”

3.2.3 Rainforest Action Network

Rainforest Action Network (RAN) was created during the “wave of awareness on the Amazon issues in the mid-80s” by Randall Hayes, the founder of RAN, was an ex-activist for Native American’s rights. The trigger event was the documentary by Adrian Cowan, *The Decade of Destruction*, released in 1986, just after the Polonoreste Project, one of the most environmentally disastrous projects funded by the World Bank, was launched.

RAN is probably the first US NGO working only with tropical rainforest (and today also with temperate forests). According to Roberto Borges (online interview, October 24, 1997), the Brazilian officer responsible for the Program Brazil, coalition and decentralization were basic in the RAN’s work. Since 1987, RAN has created 150 RAGs—Rainforest Action Groups, active in all US, with which RAN has a semiformal link.

The Program Brazil has developed two major themes: the issue of the consumption of timber, and multinational responsibility, besides solidarity with Amazon people. Its activities include, for instance, helping Brazilian activists visiting the US. That means political support (lobbying, scheduling meetings, etc.) and institutional support (to create a public and political space in the international agenda for the Brazilian issues). In the case of CITES- Conference of International Trade of Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, for instance, there has been a strong participation of the RAN in coordinating the movement in Brazil with that in the US.

The Program Brazil also includes financial support, as in the Protect and Acre Program, created in 1991. This program funds community projects, provides juridical assistance, and helps demarcation of Indian territory and other projects for the protection of tropical forest.
They also review projects and help in fundraising for projects by Brazilian NGOs' to US foundations. Finally, the Program Brazil offers technical support, with mediation of field projects in Brazil and US organizations that have the expertise for natural resource management. For that, RAN created a specific database. RAN supports the transference of technology appropriate to the local institution’s needs. The goal is to assist organizations in Brazil to form these partnerships directly and therefore, to decentralize the contacts (R. Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997).

According to Borges (online interview, October 24, 1997), RAN works in close contact with its Brazilian partners. Although active in the MDB campaign by releasing information, RAN sees itself primarily as an mediator between Brazilian NGOs and US organizations.

3.2.4 Friends of the Earth

Friends of the Earth (FoE) began as a strictly United States organization, opening its first office in San Francisco in 1969, but soon expanded to Paris (1970) and London (1971). In the early 1970s, FoE began developing an international structure called Friends of the Earth International, which grew from twenty-five member groups worldwide in 1981 to fifty-one in 1992 (and fifty-five in 1998), with relative autonomy. Although FoE is usually considered an “activist” group, it is less a direct action (street protest) group, than a lobbying organization which works to build public awareness through the news media and reports and exert pressure on Congress, the President, and government agencies.

Differently from the preceding groups, Friends of the Earth had an international profile from the very beginning. Moreover, the existence of several FoE groups in several countries makes it a network by itself. There has been a FoE Brazil since 1985, although in the
very South, in the subtropical zone. According to David Malakoff (online interview, November 14, 1997), former editor of the FoE magazine *No Man Apart* and International Program staff, in the mid-1980s, Friends of the Earth groups in the United Kingdom (UK), Malaysia, and Brazil took an active interest in tropical forest issues. In the U.S., Friends of the Earth -- because of its international affiliates--was playing a small but active role in efforts to reform the World Bank, notably the MDB campaign, also called *50 years is enough!*. In 1987 the FoE-UK began a major campaign targeting the tropical timber trade. As part of that campaign, they published a study documenting the trade in Europe. FoE-US was to prepare a similar study of the trade in the US, since this is the major market for tropical timber trade. Although a great deal of research was done, and several drafts were prepared, the study was never published. At about the same time, a number of groups with a major focus on tropical forest issues, including Greenpeace, the Rainforest Action Network, the Rainforest Alliance, Survival International, and Conservation International, became very active on rainforest issues. As a result, FoE-US's only claim to unique expertise on the issue came from its association with FoE groups in other tropical nations. It focused its efforts on helping these groups fund and promote their activities. "The most active group was FoE-Malaysia, working on Asian forests. FoE-Brazil was less active. Eventually, FoE-US's efforts in this area became focused on working together with these and other groups to influence international and national policy decisions, particularly regarding multinational lending institutions. This became even more the focus of FoE's work after it merged with the Environmental Policy Institute and the Oceanic Society in 1990. Jim Barnes and Brent Blackwelder of the Institute were major players in international issues." Still according to Malakoff, "Friends of the Earth's affiliates typically have strong relationships with local NGOs and local governments. In the US, we saw our role as
helping our affiliates strengthen these affiliations by helping our groups raise money and become known in the US" (D. Malakoff, online interview, November 14, 1997).

Since 1988, when FoE took part in a successful campaign to prevent the building of a dam in the Xingu river, Center Brazil, FoE has established many contacts in the Amazon, and partnerships with other organizations, Indigenous people, etc. In 1989 FoE International established the Amazon program, but with still a low participation directly in the area. In 1994, the GTA (Amazon Work Group), a network of 350 groups from the Amazon, joined FoE, establishing a larger basis in the region.

In the last three years, Friends of the Earth has been more active in the Amazon, with Roberto Smeraldi as full time officer for Amazon issues. After the downsizing of the activities of Greenpeace Brazil, FoE has been the most active transnational NGOs in Brazilian territory, coordinating in-depth studies, reports and forming coalitions. R Smeraldi (online interview, 1998 March 16) is Brazilian, and had worked for FoE Italy since 1986 before being transferred to Brazil. FoE Amazon currently is leading currently a campaign against predatory logging of mahogany.

3.2.5 Greenpeace

Greenpeace was formed by two expatriate American, Jim Bohlen and Irving Stone, in February 1970 out of a small British Columbia chapter of the Sierra Club, to protest against nuclear testing in the North Pacific (Opie, 1998, p. 428). Similar to the FoE process, Greenpeace started its career in the international arena. Its goal was to attract media attention to environmental issue, in an effort of having the world "bearing witness" in a Quaker tradition to wrongs against Nature. Greenpeace became famous for its "flamboyant" actions, what are considered its major strength and major weakness. Greenpeace US is one of the four
most important chapter of Greenpeace International (the others are Germany, UK and Netherlands) and has strong influence on the decisions of the international board.

In 1988, public opinion in the Northern countries—which forms the basis of support for the organization—shared a general concern on the state of the world's rainforest and the Amazon in particular. As the Amazon was perceived as a global environmental problem, Greenpeace International felt necessary to answer to this concern and to act in this area.

According to José Augusto Pádua (online interview, Jan 17, 1988), “even today there are some officers that consider that the Amazon should be the priority issue for GP.” Pádua was the Forest Campaign Coordinator for the Greenpeace Latin America, between February 1990 and May 1996.

Greenpeace International decided to create Greenpeace Latin America (GPAL) in 1988 with the Amazon issue in mind. The hired staff (most Latin Americans) had some—justified—fear that this issue would monopolize the work of the GPAL, shadowing other important questions, especially in the Central America. As in the case of FoE, RAN and EDF, the choice for a Brazilian staff, or with people long familiarized with Brazil, was a strategic move—and not without conflict. The Latin American Forest campaign had a double forum for policy decisions: the GPAL—with more social and integrated vision of the region—and the International Forest Campaign in Amsterdam. GPAL was timid on tackling the Amazon issue, while the international campaign encouraged it, with generous financial support (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998).

The relationship between Greenpeace US and GPAL was never very close. From 1990 to 1991 the coordination of the International Forest Campaign was in Washington, until it was transferred to Amsterdam in 1991. There was initially a campaigner and an assistant for the Forest Campaign in the US, and both quit when the international coordination went to
Europe. Only in 1993 was a new campaigner hired, based in San Francisco. The campaigner, Pamela Weller, was a former officer in Rainforest Action network and was hired to work mainly on the campaign against predatory logging of mahogany, that had started in Brazil in 1992. The goal was to coordinate both campaigns, Brazil and US, since the US was the major mahogany consumer market in the world. The campaign was eliminated during the financial cuts by the end of 1994, and only in 1997 Greenpeace US decided to reinitiate the process. However, despite the weaknesses of the Forest Campaign in the Greenpeace US, the American members have always showed support for the issue. Although not working directly on the Amazon, Greenpeace US provided financial support for the campaign in Latin America.

In Brazil, the forest campaign had two campaigner (Latin America and Brazil), both Brazilians with wide experience in the Amazon. Although Greenpeace didn't work with indigenous groups directly, the first executive director was an anthropologist who had worked with Guarani Indians for several years and was well known among Indian rights organizations. Greenpeace Brazil established strong links with local groups, by creating a coalition against predatory logging in Amazon. For Pádua (online interview, January 17, 1998), “this was probably the best moment of the campaign, which had a great start. In this moment GP played a fundamental role in Amazon, being a sort of 'bridge' to articulate different interests, to put together groups and to establish platforms.”

The Amazon Campaign chose the logging as its main target. According to Pádua (online interview, January 17, 1998), “that choice was strategic, because, thought we know that the major deforestation cause in Amazon is the cattle, we consider that logging was an emerging problem that open new frontiers for other deforestation causes (including cattle).” Moreover, the campaigners calculated that Greenpeace and similar international organizations
could be more efficient by confronting the international timber market that confronting the cattle issue (which reach almost exclusively domestic actors and market in Brazil). Mahogany was chosen as a symbol and concrete object to face the logging and timber issue. Mahogany would offer also an opportunity to challenge consumption patterns, especially in the Northern countries (the consumer markets) and link them to the deforestation of the Amazon (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998; see Chapter Five - Case Study: The Mahogany Campaign).

3.3 Legitimacy: from Local to Global

With few exceptions, before the decade of the 1980s most US NGOs dealt mainly with domestic questions. Three factors counted for the broadening of activities to a global scale: first, a deeper understanding by the NGOs of the nature of environmental degradation and its links to international economic and political forces; second, the development of strong alliances among NGOs from many nations, North and South; third, the emergence of a new set of issues during the 1980s that had not been identified or understood during the first wave of environmental activism of the 1960's and 70s—the destruction of the ozone layer, greenhouse warming, and the loss of tropical forests.

Matthias Finger, an international relations scholar with a deep interest in environmental NGOs, considers that “the globalization of ecology and the corresponding transformation and globalization of environmental activism corresponds to the phenomenon some call ‘global civil society’ or ‘turbulence in the world politics.’” Parallel to this “turbulence” there is the “emergence of a multicentric world consisting of thousands of non-state, no-sovereign global actors, [which] coexist in a nonhierarchical relationship with the state-centric system” (Finger, 1994, p. 48).
In other words, as we mentioned before, NGOs are the new actors in the environmental international forum. Such intrusion could not take place without some conflicts. The major conflict was the challenge of US NGOs legitimacy to act in Southern countries. This challenge can be understood in two fronts: first within the conflicts between North and South, and second, due to the NGOs' *democratic deficit* (see 3.3.2 The Democratic Deficit).

### 3.3.1 The Nationalist Challenge

The first front is easy to understand. The disputes between North and South found in the environmental forum a new space for battle. These disputes are magnified due a major characteristic of the environmental issues: although they don’t respect political borders, they are site specific, i.e., they occur in concrete places, within a concrete political framework. In the case of tropical rainforest, they occur mainly in Southern, developing countries, with a huge—and, as we have seen in the first chapter, sometimes justified—mistrust on plans by Northern countries or constituencies on what to do with the Southern natural resources.

In the Brazilian case, any discussion that could just suggest the internationalization in any way of the Amazon was enough to cause a huge uproar among the military. As Ann Kolk commented about the Brazilian nationalist reaction to the international environmental movement in Brazil, the global concern on the forests “provoked a staunch reaction of nationalist forces in the first months of 1989. Every proposal for the supposed internationalization of the Amazon in whatever form was fiercely renounced. In this period, the Brazilian media paid considerable attention to a large number of statements about and visits to the Amazon by a range of prominent foreign persons—politicians, artists, and royalty” (Kolk, 1996, p. 106).
National sovereignty includes the control of the natural resources in the nations' territory. Any attempt to interfere in this control will find jealous opposition by the nation-states, especially if the southern countries consider that this interference can affect their legitimate right to development. This tension is starkly evident in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of the 1972 UN Conference of the Human Environment, which reflects an attempt to insert a new norm of environmental responsibility into international relations. According to Principle 21, states have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment” (Liftin, 1993, p. 110).

Conca (1992b) contests the affirmation that a global environmental regime would affect the sovereignty of the nation-states. His arguments is that most policies decided in international forum call for the a larger participation and action of the nation-state, and increase, instead of dilute, the authority of the state in the management of natural resources.

However, the nationalist challenge remains, and most international NGOs have to face it soon or later.

3.3.2 The Democratic Deficit

We have to understand the structure of the NGOs to understand this second challenge to their legitimacy. I have claimed that NGOs shaped the American mentalité regarding the Amazon and other environmental issues. But the relationship between NGOs-mentalité is more complex than that. Different from Roosevelt, the naturalist, Ford and the others shapers of the cultural perception, NGOs depend on public opinion as much as they influence it.
They are not elected, as are governments; they do not generate significant income for society, as do corporations; they do not have a clear mission outside the political arena, as do churches and the academy. International relations scholars call this lack of a traditional legitimating support “democratic deficit.” The only legitimacy NGOs have is what is given to them by public support. On one side, the democratic deficit—the absence of traditional links with the constituencies—offers peculiar advantages to the NGOs. In international forums, for instance, “NGOs are not bound by national boundaries. They are accountable not to an electorate but only to their membership and, then, only insofar as membership and donations are maintained. They do not have to be nice to anyone. They can be, and often are, in the business of monitoring, exposing, criticizing, and condemning. They need not compromise on either ecological or ethical principles, or, at least, they need do so much less than governments for which the essence of maintaining good relations is, indeed, compromise” (Princen, 1994, p. 142).

On the other hand, they are continuously fighting for legitimacy to be in these international forums, and this legitimacy depends clearly in a volatile public opinion. The dependence is financial in the first place. All the organizations mentioned in the precedent item—Sierra Club, RAN, EDF, FoE and Greenpeace—depend heavily on members’ financial support to survive. Greenpeace, for its statutes, accepts money exclusively from private donors; therefore practically 100 percent of its budget comes from membership. RAN, and EDF fund their activities with 60 percent from membership and 40 percent from grants by US Foundations. Sierra Club has a more complex budget composition, but membership also plays an important role.

This situation is very specific of the US NGOs. Actually, US non-governmental organizations are much more bound to public opinion than their European siblings are, for
instance. According to Kolk (1996, p. 58), usually “NGOs in the United States are supported by private contributions, membership fees and foundations, while European NGOs rely more on financial assistance from the government (or the European Community), in addition to private donation... To survive, US NGOs need to canvass actively, wage fund-raising campaigns and place advertisements, which have to convince the public to continue to support the organization.” Therefore, the role of US NGOs in the building of an environmental awareness—and consequently in the shaping of the American environmental mentalité—is not a side effect of their actions, but a necessary condition to their existence.

This dependence is also, of course, political. When Greenpeace claims to have five million members, it is unquestionably a political asset, an vital component of its legitimacy. It is NGOs’ political asset that determine their value as a partner for governments and international forums in the decision making process, depends on theirs bargain assets. These assets include, for instance, the public support NGOs can achieve and their now history of efficiency, i.e., what they can claim as victories for the causes they defend. For instance, when the World Bank adopted environmental sustainability requirements in its guidelines, this was a major victory to the NGOs involved in the Multilateral Development Banks campaign. The organizations were then considered skilled negotiators, and their members felt being part of that victory. Correctly publicized, such victory drew more supporters.

Both assets are interlinked: the more an NGO is efficient, the more it has credibility and public support. The more it has public support (political and financial), the more it has power to bargain for its cause.

The Figure 3-1—NGOs Legitimating Sources—shows a simplified scheme on the sources of NGOs’ legitimacy. However, public support and success history are only secondary, though more tangible, sources of legitimacy. People don’t support financially and politically
NGOs for nothing. People support NGOs because they believe in their diagnosis of the problem—in the science that NGOs presented—and they agree with their moral consideration towards the problem. Therefore science and values are the ultimate sources of legitimacy of environmental NGOs.

In the passage from local to global activities, all these legitimating factors should be put to test. What was enough within national border may not suffice in a global scale. As we have seen, NGOs tend to enlarge their public support in Southern countries by building coalitions. In fact, the ability to form wide coalitions will be another bargain asset for international NGOs, as we see in the Chapter 4, Coalition: A Network Made of Conflict, Diversity and Alliances. Science and values, however, need to be at least initially analyzed here.

3.3.2.1 **Science:** In theory, science would be the best legitimating for NGOs' global action. In principle, it is universally accepted and as free from national borders as environmental issues can be. Biodiversity loss occurs when habitats are destroyed, be it in the temperate...
rainforest in Canada or in the tropical rainforests in Brazil. The more reliable date a NGO can show to support its claims, the more credibility it will acquire.

Some of the groups, mostly the smaller and more radical NGOs, are accused of inattention to factual accuracy, or making exaggerated claims, and appealing to the public's emotions. Although there are occasional isolated examples of this sort, in many cases the best weapon the NGOs have, in a lobbying contest with industry, is the credibility of NGOs research and data.

NGOs dedicated to research, the so-called "Think tanks", claim their legitimacy almost exclusively from science and from their ability of producing accurate and indisputable reports. In theory, they don't have financial interest; therefore, their reports should be unbiased.

The role of science as legitimating factor in the western society has been widely studied (Giddens, 1990). In the political agenda, probably environmental issues are the most dependent on scientific information. Unfortunately, despite common believes, scientific information is not at all free from political value. Just the opposite, different groups tend to claim the legitimating blanket to themselves, blaming the opponents for being a-scientific, the supreme anathema. This kind of dispute was seen in the polemic on Climate Change, in the 1997 Conference in Kyoto, as well as in the preparatory meetings (Liftin, 1994, p. 154).

In fact, the point is that what constitutes knowledge that is polemic, more than science itself. For instance, in the climate change question: science can provide data on the amount of greenhouse gases that are originated by different sources. But knowledge requires more: it requires the "cognizance of the connections between the problem and the larger world." In our example, "many First World interests would prefer to focus attention on the destruction of forests in the Third World and ignore that the bulk of greenhouse gases is the result of activities in the industrialized countries" (Breyman, 1993, p. 140).
Small NGOs, grassroots, also claim their legitimacy based on another type of science, i.e., local knowledge. However, this wouldn't be able to gather them a bargain asset if not linked to the other important source of legitimacy: values (in this case, the value that the knowledge of the traditional communities should be respected and that it is worth by itself), which lead to the second point.

3.3.2.2 Values: NGOs defend causes that contain values shared by most people. They seek to appear disinterested; at the same time, they have a mandate, from their members, to do their best to defend the values they advocate. These values can be wilderness, humanity, right to know, civil rights, or any other deemed right, fair and noble by the society that supports the NGOs. It is the value-based legitimacy the major factors that make people feel honored for supporting certain organizations.

The kind of validation seek in this case is not so much “what is scientifically correct,” but “what is morally good.” Environmental movements, in their daredevil actions, or in their litigation against powerful corporations in defense of Nature, offer the kind of moral heroism that appeals to public opinion. They, as said Breyman, “despite their imperfections, inspire hope for an uncertain future.... Environmental thinkers have offered a new social paradigm to replace the outdated by still dominant ideology of endless growth, boundless faith in neopositivist science and technology, patriarchy, elitist decision-making, and unbridled materialism” (Breyman, 1993, p. 125).

Many NGOs partially shape their agendas by responding to what the public considers morally (and environmentally) good. For instance, when in 1988 Greenpeace decided to create the Latin American campaign based on the concern of its constituencies regarding the Amazon (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998). Or when the Rainforest Action...
Network was created as an answer to the denunciation of predatory projects in the Amazon, funded by the World Bank (R. Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997). Likewise, part of the Greenpeace Forest campaign budget went to the defense of temperate rainforest, when they succeeded into getting a more than warm reaction from the Canadian and American public in 1993 (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998).

However, NGOs not only answer to values, they also shape values. Through their campaigns, media relations, and projects, they bring to the public attention new problems and new values. NGOs depend not so much on the public opinion, as they depend on their skill in bringing to the public opinion the issues they consider important. They depend on their skill to link particular situations to global or widely shared values. In this sense, they are much more competent and dedicated mentalité-shapers than their predecessors. As Karen Liflin, a scholar from the University of Washington, argued, "environmental crises... are not just physical phenomena, they are informational phenomena." The very way in which a crisis is defined, or constructed, on the basis of knowledge and stories, comes to empower some actors over others (Liflin, 1993, p. 21). Therefore, when Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth built their Amazon Campaigns on the consumption of tropical timber by Northern countries, they bring to the political arena not only the destruction of the rainforest (an accepted value), but also the Northern consumption patterns linking to it (a new or at least less considered value).

Here resides the major challenge for US NGOs working in the global sphere. How can NGOs assure that the values they advocate, the images they built, have global validation? Here is also where the charges of Eco-colonialism and the nationalistic challenge are more harmful. How can environmental values be morally good when they are imposed upon people who do not share them, but who should suffer from them?
Nancy Peluso, a professor on political ecology at University of Berkeley, provides a good example of NGOs' eco-colonialism regarding tropical rainforests. By lobbying for sustainable forestry, for example, and defining sustainable forestry in the terms traditionally used by Western foresters or ecologist (which generally neither acknowledge nor consider the role of people in creating so-called natural environments), they [international conservation groups] emphasize the formal, scientific, planning aspects of forest management. Most recently, the Rainforest Alliance's certification of Java teak as part of its “Smart Wood” program has provided the SFC [State Forestry Corporation, an Indonesian parastatal forest enterprise] with international legitimization for its management programs.” The certification did not consider the violence imposed upon local communities as part of its management program (Peluso, 1993, p. 65).

3.4 Conclusion

In 1992, Barbara Bramble, the National Wildlife Society international officer, wrote an article to evaluate the participation of the US NGOs in international politics. For Bramble, the experience of ten years of North South coalition shows a priority path to follow. “If there is no North South accommodation,” says Bramble, “there is no chance for building a sustainable future” (Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 335).

Coalition has been the major answer by US NGOs in dealing with the Amazon rainforest, as the NGOs' officer report in their quoted statements. Although not conflict-proof, the coalition strategy addresses most of the legitimacy challenges mentioned above. When Greenpeace claims the existence of a coalition of 70 local NGOs that support its work, it is definitively showing a wider support basis. For example, when Greenpeace advocates the choice of mahogany as a symbol of its campaign (see Chapter 5 Case Study: The Mahogany
Campaign) Greenpeace is not a solitary and foreign player anymore: it is backed by the action and legitimacy of the 70 local organizations that have been fighting the predatory logging.

Likewise, as noted above, when EDF joins with the National Council of Rubber Tappers and local communities to implant a extrativist reserve, it has more possibilities of a success history.

And of course, when any among these hires local officers, or adopts Southern agendas in their own agenda (such as the extractive reserves, or the limited selling of mahogany by Kayapós Indians), they try to create a bridge between particular values and global values—or at least shared/compatible values. In fact, as the American anthropologist Conklin and Graham (1995, p. 698) noted, “without the connection to local peoples' struggles, foreigners' protests against Amazonian deforestation can be construed as just another form of self interest first-world imperialist meddling in third-world affairs.”

However useful and widely used, the coalition strategy between so different constituencies as Northern and Southern NGOs has its advantages and weaknesses. The next chapter will deal with the establishment of coalitions in the Amazon and its political implications.
CHAPTER FOUR

4 COALITION: A NETWORK MADE OF CONFLICT, DIVERSITY AND ALLIANCES

North American NGOs have formed coalitions almost since their first incursions into Amazonian issues, both with local organizations and with international human rights networks (see Chapter 3 Thinking Globally, Acting Globally). Such strategy had forced US NGOs to accept and to work with different conceptions of nature and environmentalism. Coalition with Southern NGOs—if on one side has offered definite advantages to both partners (such as the long-sought legitimacy mention in the previous chapter)—has also brought to the sphere of NGO activity the more traditional North-South conflicts. These conflicts, as well as the success of the alliance, have shaped the action of the US NGOs in the Amazon, as well as the representation of Amazon they report to their members in America. This chapter proposes to analyze both the concrete and ideological frameworks in which the coalition between North American and Brazilian NGOs took place.

4.1 Coalition as a Multipath Strategic Tool

Activists from both North and South have echoed the sentiment that “developing partnership between environmental groups and indigenous people is one of the most important things we should be engaging in. It is both moral and practical” (Breyman, 1993, p. 144). During the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environmental and Development in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED), the “coalition was seen by the Center South group of scientists as a strategic tool for the South,” coalitions not only between North and South, but among the Southern countries and movements. “Networks and task forces of experts were necessary to counter
Northern scientific dominance in the negotiations. Contacts with Southern NGOs would have to be intensified to seek their advice, profit from their know-how, and to establish closer links with Northern NGOs in this way" (Kolk, 1996, p. 40). Likewise, Martin Khor, coordinator of the Third World Network, appeals to the cooperation between North and South movements to accomplish the coalition and international cooperation that their governments are so unlikely to try. "This is where the peoples' movements, the NGOs and individual environmentally-conscious scientists can play a role," claims Khor. "After all, there were the groups and individuals that have alerted the governments to the ecological crisis, and thus were responsible for the staging of UNCED. The voices of ordinary citizens around the world—the victims of environmental degradation, the sufferers of development gone wrong, the witnesses to Earth's and humanity's possible death throes—have to carry through the thick mist of bureaucratic wrangling, to demand to the decision-makers to stop the madness of unsustainable and unequal growth, to cooperate in a new spirit of genuine internationalism, redress the world's economic imbalances, change national development systems, and thus make possible the transition to a fair and sustainable world" (Khor, 1992, p. 49).

In an approach similar to Khor's, Barbara Bramble, from the National Wildlife Foundation, sees that the "North South dialogue may prove to be an alternative forum to the intergovernmental committees, to produce proposals for eventual official negotiation." Even more, this dialogue is sine qua non condition "for building a sustainable future." Both Khor and Bramble urge that, through international cooperation, the Northern NGOs' power of shaping public opinion may be a counter-hegemonic force to address the environmental from a

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16 Hegemony here is defined as "the structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities" (Conca 1993, 104). Many agents of policy decisions accept hegemonic values as natural, the real order of the things. NGOs can be a counter-hegemonic force because they challenge such values and propose or built new ones to be accepted by public opinion.
Southern perspective. After all, according to Bramble, there was a basic agreement among most of the US NGOs “on the overall goal of these efforts—to change the current short-sighted and consumption-driven waste of the earth’s natural resources, which is pursued by most societies in the name of economic growth, into a type of true development that is environmentally sustainable and socially equitable” (Bramble & Porter, 1992, pp. 319-350).

Strategies, however, do not go unpunished. They may have unexpected outcomes, or at least, outcomes that go beyond their immediate ends. To create a successful coalition, where both partner state their goals, South and North NGOs entered into common strategies that involved understandings and misunderstandings. These would change their earlier perceptions and their future actions in the Amazon.

Some scholars argue that such common ground is not possible. According to the American philosopher Lohmann, it is a mistake to believe that “equal exchange” or “combination of compromise of views” are possible “between groups with radically different languages. Even the shortest exchange between two people with different systems of thought must be conducted in the terms of one of the other systems, and the person whose system is not being used runs the risk of being dominated.” He proposes instead “ad hoc unions to fight interference expropriation and disruption. It means emphasizing undergrounded solidarity with those who are different rather than trying to incorporate them in new strategies for global change” (Lohmann, 1993, p. 167).

Communication (and coalition is one form of communication), however, contrarily to Lohmann’s observation, does not require total identification among the interlocutors, but only a communication intersection, a “discursive community” out of the different backgrounds of the cultures that touch each other. The challenge is to find out how and if meanings were negotiated inside this discursive community. The challenge is to discover how the process of
constructing a negotiated meaning took place—to find a new representation of ideas and issues that makes a new sense out of competing or opposed ways of seeing (Flowers, 1996, p. 47).

4.2 The Other Partner: The Brazilian Environmental Movement

Like many southern NGOs, Brazilian organizations trace their roots to political and human rights challenge. As in other Latin American countries, much of the Brazilian NGO activity grew out of the work of the Catholic Church in the 1970s and, especially, Vatican II Concillium, which called for greater social justice. “In the 1980s, a broader set of interests including environmental and public health concerns has stimulated the formation of NGOs. Throughout the South, women have been ignored in the development process and, partly as a result, many NGOs exclusively for women have been started” (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 8).

Church groups and neighborhood associations formed most of the grassroots organization in and around the cities during the 1970s. These groups were, in the first place, a response to the poverty and inequality that has characterized Brazilian economic development. They were also related to the growth of political protest against the military government that gathered pace after 1974. In a first moment, they would not define themselves as “environmentalist,” although “their demands were a direct reaction against the ecological degradation of Brazil’s urban environment: the lack of clean water and sanitation, the uncontrolled industrial pollution, and the lack of housing and basic amenities.” These many popular, grassroots movements in this transitional period from dictatorship to democracy (1974-1985) “tried to influence state policies without, however, being able to definitely oppose very powerful elite interests with a strong position in Brazilian society. Gradually a broad conglomeration of actives groups emerged, representing a landscape of urban and rural, indigenous, middle-class and popular backgrounds” (Hurrell, 1992, p. 412).
New specifically environmental groups have been created since the early 1970s, parallel and in the same context of the social movement mentioned above. Their membership was largely middle-class and which are based mostly in the industrialized south of the country. The Brazilian conservation movement has its roots in the nineteenth century and was responsible for the creation of national parks in the 1930s. The post-war period saw the formation of groups such as the Union of Protectors of the Nature (1955) and the Brazilian Foundation for the Conservation of the Nature (1958). Some environmental organizations were also formed by a nationalist impulse to “defend the Brazilian natural resources.” This is the case of the CNDDA (National Campaign for the Defense and Development of Amazon), founded in 1967 by military and national and/or communist scholars, former activists in the nationalist campaign “The Oil Is Ours” in the 1950s. The original goal of the group was to protest against the Hudson Institute’s project of damming rivers in the Amazon and forming great lakes. Likewise, in 1978 the Brazilian Government decided to create National Forest in the Amazon to be explored by private business, including foreign corporations. Out of concern for what such action could mean to the Amazon, nationalist and environmental groups were created in several Brazilian States (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998). Therefore the first signs of a political environmental consciousness appeared as part of the growing opposition to the military government.

Notwithstanding their different backgrounds, most Brazilian environmental groups at least partially shared the governmental position adopted before and during the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment persisted, which places the responsibility for global environmental pollution and its solution to developed countries. The absolute priority for developing countries should be economic growth, according to the government, or economic and equitable development, according to the emerging social movements (Kolk, 1996, p. 77).
The internal debate was, at that time, on the costs or on the type of development and, above all, the control of natural resources by the different sectors. This dispute assumed explicit contours during the Constitutional process (1986-1988), when international pressure in environmental issues was already a factor in domestic politics. A large mobilization and the formation of effective lobbies by the popular sectors obtained significant conquest in the Constitution of 1988, compared to the previous, elite-dominated constitutions could be seen.17 “The proposals put forward by the unions, the environmental movement, Indian organizations and others centered on agrarian reform, workers’ and indigenous rights, and the preservation of the environment. In the Amazon the most important issues were the question of Indian rights and mineral resources in their territories, the environment and agrarian reform.... The results therefore need to be placed within a wider context, particularly because the salient issue of agrarian reform was blocked.... It is likely that the elites allowed the restriction on mining in indigenous areas to forestall pressure on the more delicate issues of land reform and worker’s right. In addition, the most sensitive aspects of the mining question were circumvented (especially to declare mining rights in Indian areas null and void)” (Kolk, 1996, p. 101).

It was not surprising that most US NGOs failed to see the environmentalist element in the Brazilian social movement. In 1996, the Brazilian NGO Maternatura, together with the World Wildlife Foundation, elaborated a directory of environmental organizations in Brazil. While defining the guidelines for the publication, the editors found out that a strict environmental criteria would leave out some of the most environmentally active NGOs, such as FASE (Association of Organizations for Social and Educational Assistance), IBASE (Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses), or the National Council of Rubber-
The two former organizations define themselves as “development NGOs,” which means that their major institutional goals are alternative development, social justice and protection of minorities. They claim, however, that it is impossible to address such questions in Brazil without considering the environmental dimension and the management of natural resources. Likewise, they also understand that it is impossible to address the environmental questions without considering the social and development needs.

4.3 Environmentalism in Northern and Southern Traditions

The deeply rooted differences between North American and Brazilian NGOs raised the question whether a real and successful coalition was possible. Could a common basis for a dialogue be found in these two different experiences of environmentalism?

Since its beginning, environmentalism has been considered a new social movement, characteristic of rich countries whose basic needs were already met. Hobsbawm went so far to call environmentalism a “full belly movement.” Yet there has been a mature and often heroic environmental movement in southern countries—which by no means can be considered “full belly.” Northern and southern environmental movements remain quite different in focus and ethical basis. R. Guha, an Indian environmental scholar, intensified these differences in a rather dualistic, yet lucid way. Northern environmentalism, says Guha, is primarily concerned with a dichotomy which polarizes the rights of humans and the rights of non-humans, while southern environmentalist is concerned with a dichotomy which polarizes rich humans and poor humans. Northern environmentalism has aesthetic and ethical goals, while the southern

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18 This analyses session is a result of the discussion the course “Environmental Ethics,” conducted by Prof. Eric Katz at New Jersey Institute of Technology in the Spring 1997.
environmentalism fights for the survival of communities and the use of natural resources.19 Northern environmentalism wants to change values and cultures, while the southern wants to change the production and wealth distribution system. Finally, northern environmentalism considers the planet as a whole, while in the South the environment movement is based in the local issues (Guha, 1997). Guha developed better his thesis for an “environmentalism of the poor” in his book with J. Martinez-Allier, in which the authors propose a less dualistic or Manichean position toward environmentalism (see Table 4.1).

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<th>MATERIALISM</th>
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<td>In affluent</td>
<td>Reaction against the increased impact of the effluents of affluence (e.g., the environmental justice movement in the United States, the anti-nuclear movement).</td>
<td>Cultural shift to postmaterial ”quality of life” values and increased appreciation of natural amenities because of declining marginal utility of abundant, easily obtained material commodities</td>
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<tr>
<td>In poor countries</td>
<td>The environmentalism of the poor (i.e., the defense of livelihood and communal access to natural resources, threatened by the state or by the expansion of the market). Reaction against environmental degradation caused by unequal exchange, poverty and population growth</td>
<td>“Biocentric” eastern religions (as distinct from western ”anthropocentric” religions). Essentialist eco-feminism (poor women intrinsically closer to nature)</td>
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Guha stresses the differences between the two movements and the impossibility for the northern environmental movement to answer the questions posed by the southern environmental movement. My point is quite the opposite: I want to demonstrate the basis for agreement and cooperation between those two movements, without obliterating their differences. Therefore I look for the nuances and similarities that Guha has left aside.

19 It is tempting to go even further in Guha’s comparison, although this is not our current goal. As J. A. Drummond (personal email, August 24, 1997) noted, southern environmentalism fights not only for access to natural resources, but also for fair prices for their products which hold the potential to alleviate poverty.
First, the northern environmental movement in general—and the American in particular—is not blind to claims for environmental justice or for local solutions. This can be seen not only in the European movement, but also in the American grassroots movement and, more recently, even among the so-called mainstream organizations (Gottlieb, 1993; Pulido, 1996). The picture would be correct, however, had Guha referred only to the wilderness preservation movement. Even so, the wilderness movement has demonstrated more responsiveness to social issues, without losing its focus on the preservation of nature.

Second, the southern environmental movement is not as purely materialist as depicted by Guha in his brief summary. We should notice that one of the most potent criticisms against the Western society by the southern environmentalists is exactly about Western excessive materialism (Unger, 1991; Leis, 1996). Southern environmentalists give to holism their own meaning when they argue that the fight for the environment is also a fight for all aspects of life. Southern communities fight also for dignity, identity in itself and in relation to the nature, and access to nature. Southern communities fight against marginalization. To deny the non-materialistic aspects of this movement is to impoverish it. In fact, as it can be seen in the figure above, Guha includes this non-materialist aspect in his longer analysis (Guha & Martinez-Allier, 1997).

These non-materialist aspects include also a non-materialist understanding of nature, and, in some cases, a consideration toward nature in itself. Rubber tappers, forest workers in extractive (gathering) reserves in the Amazon, have their own way to “evaluate nature for itself”—although quite far from more sophisticated schemes of “intrinsic and instrumental values.” This is part, and not an unimportant one, of their more immediate and basic fight for survival. Popular religions based on nature or the forest, such as the “Daime” or ayhuasca cult,
are no less important an element of the rubber tapper strategy of survival than the "empate" (the rubber tappers' tree-hugging tactic).

However, let us admit that Guha’s picture of northern and southern movement serves a purpose. Let us admit that the North and South dichotomy is the embodiment of more traditional dichotomies in environmental ethics: anthropocentrism and non-biocentrism, social ecology and deep ecology, ontological views and materialist views. Even so, such differences do not necessarily prevent northern and southern environmental movements from working together for definitions of international environmental policies. To recognize the value of the forest should not prevent non-anthropocentrists from recognizing the third world’s dependence from and relation to the environment—and their right to have a voice in political decision regarding the environment where they live.

There is nothing in the non-anthropocentric point of view that necessarily means that survival of human beings should not be taken into account. “There is no inherent antagonism,” says the deep ecology philosopher A. Naess (1994, p. 399), “between human settlement and free nature, for it all depends on the kind of culture humans have.”

The American philosopher Eric Katz, although highly committed to a non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, stresses the “outstanding debts” of the richer nations of the world to both nature and third world peoples, who are now asked to keep from developing their natural resources for the sake of preservation of nature. The first world has previously

20 In 1994, due to my work, I was often in touch with environmental groups in the Amazon region. One day I met a member of the Cooperativa Xapuri, the rubber tapper union founded by Chico Mendes in 1986. I asked him why he thought that it was important to preserve the forest. He answered me that it was because the forest was the lung of his world, it was the air. “Oh, no,” I said to myself, “he still believes that the Amazon is the lungs of the world. Everybody knows it is a climatic forest, and it consumes as much oxygen as it produces.” I put on my tolerant-intellectual face, that face you make when you know better than your guest, but you are polite enough not to let him know he just made a faux pas. I had understood nothing. He was talking of something much more serious than science. "The forest," he continued, "is around us, like the air, and involves everything. It gives sense to everything that dwells in it. The animals die without the forest, the soil disappears, the sun is hotter, and we don't have work. Then the forest is the lung and the river is the blood."
gained the benefits of environmental destruction and economic development, and it should now pay its fair share of the burden that the poorer nations have to bear regarding the preservation of a diverse planetary environment. In fact, Katz argues that concern for the indigenous people in the Third World is an intrinsic part of a non-anthropocentric ethics. “Any implementation of environmental policy must include not only the moral consideration of all benefits and burdens resulting from the policy. Justice extends to all members of the moral community, however we have broadened the notion of community. Within this broadened human and natural community are the indigenous people of the third world who need to gain access to the realm of economic development” (Katz, 1997, p. 175).

On the other hand, forest people usually see their fates linked to the forest. Some of them probably would recognize themselves more easily in the biotic community described by Aldo Leopold (1949/1996) than any high executive of a mainstream organization in the North. Therefore, the preservation of natural areas, where nature can carry on freely its processes, means the preservation of their own culture, lifestyles and lives. Populations in the third world are therefore painfully aware of the effects of the “massive destruction we have imposed on natural systems” right now (Katz, 1997, p. 176). They are the first to suffer the lack of water, the loss of the forest or the loss and poisoning of the soils. On one side they bear the damaging effect of the industrial world; on the other side they lack the benefits of such a world.

Consideration for nature and concern for environmental justice and equity permeate both North and South environmentalism, with wide variations according to their internal diversity. The challenge is less an absolute opposition of both species of environmentalist and more a strategic dilemma for the integration of North and South environmentalisms’ goals. The South environmental movement is more likely to receive support from Northern...
environmentalist as long as they can drive their demands to common goals (i.e., the preservation of "wilderness").

In a reverse example, were southern environmentalists to recognize in consumerism and militarism the major threats to their environment, would they find the same willing support that northern environmentalism offer to the establishment of national parks and reservations in the tropical forests? In other words, would the same alliance that qualifies "ethical and sustainable" behavior for the Kayapós be strong enough to establish "ethical and sustainable" practices for the northern partners?

These are some of the questions that North and South partners face in the establishing their coalitions. The next items discuss the conflicts and the advances that are also a result of such questions.

4.3.1 Conflict Areas

The first source of conflict in the US-Brazil NGOs coalitions results from their historical origins. As it was seen above, the majority of US NGOs involved in the Amazon are basically environmental in orientation, whereas in Brazil many of the groups focus on social justice, or represent grass-roots movements or union. This leads to divergent priorities and may cause fundamental splits in the vulnerable North-South NGO alliances. Besides, most are relatively new with little history of personal trust (Bramble & Porter, 1992, p. 350).

Also, because of their primary commitment to a national level, as opposed to an international level, these Brazilian NGOs display significant ideological and political differences among themselves, mostly over political strategy but sometimes also over the question of environment versus development. In some cases, however, such domestic gaps can be bridged by the intervention of a international, third party. In 1993, for instance,
Greenpeace succeeded in creating a coalition of over seventy Amazon NGOs that had been reluctant even to attend to the same meetings (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998). However, during the UNCED there were often conflicts over leadership in the such international coalition, in particular between environmental NGOs from the North and development-orientated NGOs from the South (Finger, 1994a, p. 210).

4.3.1.1 *An Unequal Relationship?* Brazilian NGOs have been wary because of the differences in political orientation, and also because of the size and financial power of US NGOs. Local organizations are perfectly aware of their role as the source of legitimacy for their US partners, and they want to make sure that they are not simply being used in the bargain. For instance, in the Greenpeace coalition with Amazon organizations against predatory logging, sometimes the media's excessive interest on Greenpeace caused problems. Some organizations considered themselves less valued or dismissed by the media (see Chapter 5, Case Study: The Mahogany Campaign). The coordinator of the campaign, José Pádua (online interview, January 17, 1998), offers some examples: “Sopren [a local partner] has an ideological mistrust on the GP, but this group has several problems of relationship with other Amazon groups. I recall also that the GDA [Grupo de Defesa da Amazônia – Group of Defense of the Amazon] in Santarém showed a serious ideological concern about the possibility of being used by the GP, but they have never outspoken how that could have happened. It is difficult to know, because the amazon culture has this tradition of ‘cordiality’ and they would not complain on your face” (J. A. Pádua, online interview, January 17, 1998).

Other Southern partners are not so shy. Jhamtani, coordinator of a development NGO in Malaysia, complains that “anybody working in the development and environmental
field recognizes issues such as sustainable development, social forestry, management of national parks, women in development and, most recently, the conservation of biological diversity. It was First World NGOs that put these issues on the agenda without consulting us. Third World NGOs, including my own, took them up because they meant money and support" (Jhamtani, 1992, p. 5).

The financial dependence and the consequent setting of the agenda are highly delicate issues for both sides of the partnership. For the Brazilian organizations, these are delicate issues because they would be deviating from their primary goals of equity; for the American NGOs, these are delicate issues because a partnership that reproduces old colonialist schemes instead of challenging them loses all its legitimating purpose. The charge of eco-colonialism (Guha, 1989; Luke, 1997) haunts every North-South coalition as a permanent and vigilant watchdog.

We are avoiding here cases where the nature of the donor/recipient roles is explicit in the coalition, and we have chosen instead cases where the bargain is more political and immaterial. But there is no doubt that the financial aspect is fundamental. On one side, local NGOs tend to expect from their US partner, if not cash, at least full infrastructure commitment and support—which in some cases is not possible (Schwartzman, phone interview, October 17, 1997; Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997). For instance, J. A. Pádua (online interview, January 17, 1998) recalls a high overestimation and “mythicizing of Greenpeace’s capacity of work and financial resources, which was even more problematic when Greenpeace International started its financial crisis [in 1993].” On the other side, Southern NGOs see their legitimating asset being transformed in hard cash for their partners. Over a dispute with a former partner, Jhamtani says “This group and other First Word NGOs still secure financial support by having partners in the Third World” (Jhamtani, 1992, p. 5).
Even when there is a real transference of resources from North to Brazilian NGOs, dilemmas arise. Since the funds come from the North, does not that put Southern NGOs in a more or less dependent position?

More than the transference of funds, Brazilian NGOs showed concern on the definition of priority issues in the coalition agenda and on the possibility of being misrepresented by their US partners. In this sense, a good example is the document issued in 1989 by the Coordinating Body for the Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COIC), representing more than a million tribal people of South America. The language could not be more explicit. While appreciative of ecology movement efforts, COIC said:

“It should be made clear that we never delegated … power to the environmentalist community nor to any individual or organization in that community…. We are concerned that you have left us, the Indigenous Peoples, out of your vision of the Amazonian biosphere. The focus of concern of the environmental community has typically been the preservation of the tropical forest and its plant and animal inhabitants. You have shown little interest in its human inhabitants who are also part of that biosphere. We are concerned that you have left us Indigenous Peoples and our organizations out of the political process which is determining the future of our homeland. While we appreciate your efforts on our behalf, we want to make it clear that we never delegated any power of representation to any individual or organization within that community” (qt. in Hawkins, 1993, 241).

EDF and other large institutions agree that one of the major problem is to make the agendas between local and international organizations compatible. “The response time,” says the EDF officer Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), “is very different. The
multilateral development banks campaign showed that we have different institutional cultures. It is difficult to make meaningful alliances, when we have such different institutional weight and different potential levels of influence. For each institution we have to adapt to a certain context.” But he defends that the same is true also among the Amazonian organizations themselves. “For instance, take the Conselho Indigenista Missionário de Roraima (CIMI-Roraima), which is close to the Catholic Church. They have serious infrastructure problems. At the same time, they do a lot of stuff, usually in opposition to the governmental of Roraima, while the CONIVE (Conselho Indigenista da Venezuela), a similar small organization in Venezuela, has never been listened by the government and is totally marginalized. So, CIMI and the CONIVE have very different strategies, and a disproportional leverage power.”

The definition of the Amazon agenda is a bitter point of dispute; even more bitter for Brazilian NGOs is the comparable disregard that the US NGOs show for other urgent Brazilian environmental issues. More than deforestation in remote tropical frontiers, the steady deterioration of urban areas has garnered the attention of millions of Latin Americans, 70 percent of whom live in cities where air pollution, water quality, and solid wastes negatively affect their lives. Brazilian NGOs fear to see their government spending huge amounts of human and financial resources in an issue that is not the national priority, but a global priority, while the other more urgent issues for the Brazilian population go unattended. On the other hand, they find themselves with domestic conflicts that are far from affecting US NGOs. As Kolk well points out, “public mobilization [for the Amazon] in the North has been relatively easy because of the impressive magnitude of forest, the large number of animals and species, the climatic aspects, in short, the concern for nature, and of the fact that the engagement does not have to lead to substantial changes in production and consumption patterns in the North”
In other words, public mobilization has been easy in the North because the forests (and the political costs) are located in the South.

One major political cost for Brazilian NGOs is that the coalition itself threatens their domestic legitimacy local NGOs. It is true that international financial, moral and political support for their causes strengthened the Brazilian NGOs in their struggle, especially when direct access to decision-making authorities is not granted. This was especially true during the military dictatorship (1964-1985). But at the same time, this support also “made them vulnerable to accusations of paving the way for outside interference in national affairs a sensitive matter,” as it is the sovereignty issue, particularly in Brazil. They are charged with following a foreign agenda (Martins, 1997) and with being pawns in the interest of foreign agents. In 1988, when the Kayapó leader Payakan and Kube-I traveled to the United States and testified against the Xingú River dams (a World Bank funded project), they returned to Brazil and were charged with sedition under a law applied to foreigners. In even more explicit words, the National War College, a highly influenced military institution, stated that “the domestic subversives of the 1990s are ecologists linked to this international movement” (Conklin & Graham, 1995, p. 701).

Greenpeace has been a common target for this charge because it is an international organization with a Brazilian staff. Pádua (online interview, January 17, 1998) says bitterly that the nationalist argument was frequently used “by corporations or members of an elite used to free access and exploitation of the Amazon resources. It is very hypocritical, because in their relationship with the international capital their behavior was openly welcoming and subservient. For instance, Danilo Remor, owner of the sawmill Maginco, a loud voice against the internationalization of Amazon, is now an associate of the Malaysian capital [to explore the
Amazon. The nationalist argument was valid only against environmental groups and the Indians.”

Autonomy and sovereignty are important values for the Brazilian NGOs themselves. By challenging national elites and government, Brazilian NGOs seek to strengthen local control over natural resources, not relinquish it to a global authority. As stressed by the Indian activist Vandana Shiva (1993, p. 150), the NGOs’ role of linking the global to the local, should fortified the local, and not weaken its autonomy. However, the nationalist charge can be very harmful, when it identifies the government with the nation, and the opponents of the government with the enemies of the nation.

For historical reasons, the internationalization of Amazon is a highly sensitive issue in Brazil. Vague proposals of global control over the Amazon in the 1970s were equally refused by Brazilian government, NGOs and public alike (Kolk, 1996). The environmental suggestion that Brazilians cannot protect their own natural resources is similar to the developmentist suggestion by Lieutenant Maury (see 2.2 The Traveler) that Brazilians could not correctly develop the full potential of the wasted Amazon resources. Currently, none among the most important NGOs with activities in the Amazon would even suggest similar proposals.

However, although most US NGOs support a “democratic reform that gives a voice to forest dwellers in determining their own future,” some groups defend “the establishment of strong international efforts to prevent ecosystem destruction, even when it is supported by local government and populations.” In this perspective, the fundamental goal is conservation, and local governments or populations may be focusing on short-term benefits rather than long-term costs” (D. Malakoff, online interview, November 14, 1998).
4.3.1.2 The Environmental Noble Savage: The concept of an "environmental noble savage" successfully exemplifies the risk of conflict in a coalition where the Brazilian partner wants autonomy and control over natural resources, while the US partner wants to preserve the same resources. In Brazil, Indians and environmentalists discovered common cause in opposing ecologically destructive dams, roads, mines, and colonization schemes. US and European NGOs joined forces with indigenous communities in defense of native rights to land and resources. "The contemporary equation of indigenous resource management practices with Western environmentalism has promoted an image of Amazonian Indians that Kend Redford dubbed 'the Ecologically Noble Savage.' This is the latest expression of a long tradition of Euro-American thought that identifies certain non-Western 'primitives' as innocent and free of corruption, in contrast to the West's destructive materialism," in the best Rousseauian tradition (Conklin & Graham, 1995, p.696; Darnovsky, 1995, p. 22).

To explain this alliance between Brazilian Indians and first-world environmental activists—and the limitations of such alliance—Conklin and Graham coined the idea of "global ecological imaginary." The global ecological imaginary, according to the authors, "is based mostly on abstract notions about the convergence between native and environmentalist visions for the future... It emerges not from the reality of concrete everyday experiences but in the circulation of collective held images." The result is a chimerical "global eco-village" which creates and shares notions of transcultural eco-solidarity. The effects of such an imaginary cannot be underestimated. It generated unprecedented international support for local Amazon struggles that helped some Brazilian Indians gain important land rights and more favorable government policies. "Since the 1980s, indigenous people have become key symbols, as well as key participants, in the development of an ideology and organization networks that links local
Amazonian conflicts to international issues and social movements (Conklin & Graham, 1995, p. 696).

However, Conklin and Graham (1995, p. 696) alert us against the projection of environmentalist expectations on the representation of the Amazon Indians. "The stereotype of native people as natural conservationists forms a precarious foundation for indigenous rights advocacy because it misrepresents the nature of native Amazonian communities and their priorities." Other scholars, such as Candace Slater (1995), Buege (1996) and Brosius (1997), agree with the alert and fear for the effects that such misrepresentation can have on the fate of the Amazon Indian communities.

Although this relationship has benefited both environmentalist and Indian interests, it has clear limitations. First, as seen in the previous section (4.1.1.1 An Unequal Relationship?), the relationship between Indians and Northern environmentalists can undermine the domestic political power that the Indian communities may have in Brazil, if they are identified with foreign interests, "pawns of foreign economic imperialists seeking to interfere in Brazilian national affairs and control the country's natural resources."

The strongest limitation, however, is the backlash effect that this alliance can suffer if the image of "environmental noble savage" is not confirmed in every and each deed. Historically, indigenous advocacy was based on human rights notions about the intrinsic value of distinct cultures and universal rights to physical and cultural survival. If the legitimacy for their claims now comes not from their traditional rights, but from their allegedly environmental practices, what would happen to this legitimacy if and when their practices are not considered environmentally sound by the Northern allies anymore?

Sustainable systems of natural resource management are the primary goal for environmentalists, not for Indigenous Peoples. Instead, they "ultimately seek self-
determination and control over their own resources. The degree to which these two sets of priorities coincide is debatable. The need to participate in the market economy is a given reality for the vast majority of Brazilian Indians. Native activists thus confront a quandary: they can forge alliances with outsiders only by framing their cause in terms that appeal to Northern values, but "this foreign framework does not necessarily encompass indigenous communities' own worldviews and priorities. Indianness and signs of Indianness for the Western world have a symbolic value that is not intrinsic but bestowed from the outside" (Conklin & Graham, 1995, p. 702).

The alliance, therefore, has worked only as far as the environmentalist's interest in preservation of the forest and the Indian's interest in self-determination have agreed. When some Kayapós groups tried to reproduce non-sustainable practices of commercial logging, they faced heavy criticism from their former environmentalist allies. In capitalizing on symbolic values bestowed from the outside, native Amazonian activists may, ironically, have substituted one form of dependency for another.

This dilemma is not different from the faced by Native Americans in their relationship with the environmental movement. As the environmental philosopher Douglas Schwartz writes, "we admire Indians so long as they appear to remain what we imagine and desire them to be: ecologically noble savages symbolizing a better way of life than we ourselves find it practical to live. We respect their traditions so long as they fit our preconceived notions of what those traditions should be. Let their ways cross purposes with ours, however, and we not only cease to admire them (which in some cases might be justifiable), but begin actively to resent them for not living up to our ideals. If a White hunter shoots an eagle we are angry. But if an Indian shoots an eagle we are outraged; an Indian should know better!" (Schwartz, 1987, p. 298).
Conklin and Graham (1997, p. 709) urge for the environmentalism movement to "move beyond the pitfalls of relying on unrealistic assumptions about who Indians are, what Indians want, and what Indians need for political survival." This would increase the possibility of less vulnerable alliances and would help to soothe the way for the rainforest's native peoples and their allies to find common paths over this shifting middle ground. According to the authors, this process has already started: "Today, Native Amazonians have already begun to reshape Western environmentalism into forms suited to their own objectives and realities."

The authors, however, do not provide any example of this turning point.

Most environmentalists, however, see the alliance with indigenous people with a very positive assessment. Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997) and Borges (online interview, October 24, 1997) argued for the efficiency of such strategy. Borges says that "we have only but to compare the preservation in the national Park of Xingú to the existent degraded areas around it, in the borders, to see how the demarcation of Indian territories has meant real protection to the forest."

All authors agree that, until now, the alliance with environmentalists has been most fruitful for the Indigenous communities. "We should consider, for instance," says Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), "that the Indigenous communities have never before been consulted by the World Bank in the projects that affected them. We succeeded to have the Kayapós in meetings in Washington in which they claimed the right of being consulted because they were local constituencies.... In 1985 there was no understanding of the indigenous people by the environmental NGOs. [The alliance with environmental organizations] has basically been great for them, the indigenous groups. The World Bank forced the Brazilian Government to speed the demarcation, under pressure from NGOs in
Washington. So, maybe the image of the Indian is romanticized, but it brings benefits. There is a greater understanding of these issues today."

According to Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), whose relation with the Amazon Indians predates his work with environmental organizations, “we should be also aware of two different issues. One is that the defense of the Indians rights is a legitimate cause per se. And second, it is also a good ‘window’ to know alternatives of the use of the forest.”

4.3.2 Advances and Gains

Despite several areas of conflict, North American and Brazilian NGOs have looked for more and stronger links. The coalition strategy offers advantages that they couldn't have otherwise, and that means that both partners have had to learn to work together in order to assure their gains. Besides legitimacy, discussed in the previous chapter, there are several others gains and advantages of the coalition strategy.

One of these advantages is the transference of funds, seen in the previous item as a possible source of conflict. Many groups, such as the National Council of Rubber Tappers, have received significant funding from abroad. They could not have kept their work without that. The funding of projects by Northern NGOs has turned the Amazon in a interesting laboratory for projects of sustainable development, though all the warnings of dominance and eco-colonialism should apply (R. Borges, online interview, October 24, 1997). Transference of funds has also been crucial in legal battles by local constituencies, such as the demarcation of the territory of the Paraná Indians, who received legal and financial support from the Brazilian Instituto Socioambiental and EDF.

Another important point is the exchange of information. Chico Mendes, founder of the National Council of Rubber Tappers, stresses the support received from the scientist
throughout the world in their struggle. "In this fight," said Mendes, "our only defense is the pressure put on the authorities by Brazilian society and the international scientific community". The rubber tappers' union relies on a small network of academics and the Institute of Amazon Studies, which Mendes called a "strategic center of the movement". The possibilities for information exchange are multiple, although it has not been throughout explored. "Scientists can be supportive allies in the struggles of Southern movements, and northern environmentalists can reinforce these coalitions by bringing together grassroots wisdom and scientific insight.... Third World ecologists can also help themselves by helping their Northern neighbors (and vice versa) as the successful visits to Washington of Chico Mendes and Yanomami Indians attest. These visits helped U.S. organizations more effectively work the halls of power on behalf of Amazonian ecosystems and peoples" (Breyman, 1993, p. 143).

Some solutions of sustainability are now born in the South, and Northern NGOs are looking to the South for ideas, as well as to establish their own international credibility. This is the source of success for the Rainforest Network Action's fundraising efforts, according to Borges (online interview, October 24, 1997): foundations are interested in creative solutions from South NGOs, that can be reproduced elsewhere. "Thus although among governments the trend in financial and technology flows has been from the North to the South, the technology of sustainable development is increasingly flowing from South to North."

Examples of this new technological flow are the concept of extrativist reserves (see footnote 14) and the Grameen Bank, a non-profit, small-loan, self-help development bank in Bangladesh that lends to landless poor and, especially, women. It has been so successful (with, for example, 98 per cent repayment rates), that the South Shore Bank of Chicago in the United States is emulating it" (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 8).
The representation of Brazilian NGOs in the domestic decision making process has also benefited from the transnational linkages, "whether those linkages are made with international NGOs and outside environmental groups or thorough pressures from international lending institution, bilateral assistance agencies, UN bodies, and other.... The growing attention being paid by outside organizations is encouraging developing-country governments to include national NGOs within governmental decision-making" (Hawkings, 1993, p. 240). For instance, in 1993 international pressure forced the Brazilian environmental agency to take concrete steps for a sustainable tropical timber policy. The agency invited ten local NGOs that were studying or working with the subject. Such invitation would be unthinkable just some years before.

Not only local NGOs but also local communities, even when non-organized, have been recognized. Part of the preservation policy defended by the US NGOs in the campaign against multilateral development banks (see chapter II) was the "position that preservation is important and that, if forest resources are used, local populations should reap the benefits and determine the speed at which this takes place. The increased concern for the fate of the forest inhabitants, whether indigenous peoples or not, was also a significant characteristic of environmental attention related to rainforest in the 1980" (Kolk, 1996, p. 34). The Amazon hosts a multitude of different human groups, indigenous and non-indigenous. Just recently the international US NGOs has included communities other than Indian and rubber-tappers in their projects and campaigns. *Ribeirinhos* (fluvial communities), descendants of runaway slaves and small peasants, are now considered legitimate constituencies in projects funded by the World Bank or national government, if they can prove they will be affected.

Politically, Brazilian NGOs have counted on their international linkages as a form of protection against violence and authoritarianism. This is perhaps the oldest benefit from such
linkages, previous even to the involvement of the environmental international NGOs. "The
work of groups such as Survival International, OXFAM, and Amnesty International has been
critical in publicizing the scale of violence and thereby offering an albeit fragile degree of
support and protection" (Hurrell, 1992, p. 414). The difference is that now environmental
activists, or "ecodissident," are protected. Violence in the countryside is still a terrible feature
of the Brazilian society. Chico Mendes, Paulo Vinhas and Amazon Indians are just the most
famous victims.

The density and range of these transnational linkages has thus been a very important
characteristic of the politicization of the Amazon question in Brazil. "The political impact of
social mobilization in the Amazon was largely the result of these transnationalities and their
contribution to the international campaign against Brazilian governmental policies, rather than
the result of direct pressure on the government in Brasilia" (Hurrell, 1992, p. 414).

It is in international forums that the coalition offers the best advantages. Bramble and
Porter (1992, p. 380) defined what they saw as the role of the US NGOs in the UNCED, after
10 years of experience in North-South coalitions. "The NGOs in the North can build the
political will to take action on certain issues, through education, specific campaigns, and the
media. The information and proposals the Northern NGOs bring to their members can be
shaped by Southern NGOs through the process of dialogue and working together over time.
In the run-up to UNCED over the period 1990-2 there were over a dozen major NGO
conferences where controversial development and environment questions could be hammered
out." The "process of dialogue and working together" found Brazilian NGOs looking for
greater autonomy and less dependence on Northern supporters. In the multilateral
development bank campaign, for example, Brazilian or other Southern NGOs have been
taking "more of the responsibility for setting NGO strategy. In so doing, they have taken up
some of the tougher issues of international debt and trade, and even the question of whether
the banks should be abolished" (Princen & Finger, 1994, p. 9). The Pilot Program for the
Brazilian Amazon is another example of cooperation between international organizations and
NGOs, and between governments and NGOs, on which the Brazilian government only
agreed after strong pressure was applied (Kolk, 1996, p. 253).

However, besides the traditional forums such as the UN agencies and the Multilateral
Development Banks, there are a number of international forums that potentially deal with
Amazon issues. Just to quote some, there are the Forest Stewardship Council, that discuss
sustainable guidelines for forest products; the Convention on International Trade of
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora—CITES; the Intergovernmental Panel on Forest; the
International Tropical Timber Organization; and the environmental chapter of the WTO
(World Trade Organization). Each of these Forums has its own meetings, agendas, and
schedules, demanding a commitment of human and financial resources that cannot be
matched by many Brazilian NGOs. IBASE and FASE, two of the largest Brazilian
Development NGOs, tend to split and cooperate to cover most of them, with only reasonable
success. Therefore, there is a huge imbalance in the representation of North and South NGOs.
Some US NGOs, however, have financed the participation of their Brazilian partners in these
meetings. The National Council of Rubber Tappers went to the Forest Stewardship Council’s
first meeting in Toronto thanks to the support of the National Wildlife Foundation. Even
when the actual representative cannot take part in the meeting, coalitions have brought
Brazilian struggles to international meetings, as it happened in the case of the attempts of
listing of the Amazon timber Mahogany in the Appendix II of CITES (see Chapter 5, Case
Study: The Mahogany Campaign).
Besides international forums, international markets can be highly affected by successful international coalitions. According to Pádua (online interview, January 17, 1998), “international organizations have more capacity of work when there is an international market and when the consumption is mainly in other countries. The mahogany case opened good possibilities in this field, showing us the possibility of playing with the market in other countries to affect the action of the domestic actors.” In the case of mahogany, about 80% of the Brazilian production go to the international market, mainly England and United States. As it will be seen in Chapter 5, the mahogany campaign established a link between Northern consumption patterns and the actual destruction of the Amazon, or at least the broadening of the deforestation frontiers.

### 4.4 Conclusions

Most authors agree that one of the most important effects of the Amazon coalition (and other North-South coalitions) was to broaden the understanding of environmentalism beyond the classic western concept. As Damovsky (1995, p. 22) nicely put it, in the 1990s “the rubric of environmentalism has firmly linked trees, along with the rest of non-human nature, to social change and social justice. Speaking of trees conjures crimes of all manner: the clearcutting of California last ancient forests to payoff the junk bonds debts accumulated by lumber companies; the murder of radical unionist Chico Mendes by Brazilian ranchers aiming to destroy a growing rainforest alliance among rubber tappers, indigenous people, and North American environmentalists; the acid rain, unchecked by its corporate producers of government regulators, that kills woodlands and sterilizes lakes; the bulldozing of Palestinian orchards by the Israeli army as punishment for the intifada.”
Some authors that are also actors in this process, such as the EDF coordinator Stephen Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997), considered that the Amazon alliance "was a landmark for the environmental movement in the US," not only for on Amazon issues. "Traditional conservationist movements now pay attention to the relationship between social and environmental problems, and make deeper criticisms to development models. For instance, in 1985 organizations such as the Sierra Club had no contact with grassroots movements. Nowadays this exchange is a common place."

The coalition is not a strategy free of conflicts. Criticizing the unequal international situation, a common request by Brazilians to their US NGOs partners, has been more difficult for the Northern NGOs, "because if they object to existing patterns of production and consumption they could come into conflict with their adherents and undermine their own bases of support." In contrast to the more integrated (social and environmental) perspectives of many Southern organizations, Northern NGOs have therefore either focused on global inequality and debt problems (development organizations) or on environmental problems, often those of the South (environmental organization). "However, a critique of Northern lifestyles is gradually being incorporated into this environmental analysis, and cooperation between these two types of NGOs started recently" (Kolk, 1996, p. 56).

This evolution in the process of understanding and accepting differences is probably the more effective change that the coalitions can brought about.

A last note, however, should be said about the limits in the effectiveness of the coalition as a strategic tool. Schwartzman (phone interview, October 17, 1997) alerts us that the different expectations from the partners in the coalitions may led to frustrating outcomes. "We work in partnership with Southern institutions; we give attention and publicize problems in the South. The problem is that sometimes campaigns give different kinds of benefits to the
partners. For instance, in the multilateral bank campaign, we worked with local organizations to halt the Narmada Dam project, funded by the World Bank. Well, we succeeded to have the World Bank withdrawing its support. But the Indian government decided to maintain the project with its own funds.” Therefore, a huge victory for US NGOs did not correspond to an equivalent victory to their partners in India.

Schwartzman also alerts us that a next step now should come from the local grassroots and NGOs. “They have to create greater connection and to strength their national influence; they have to work with their government more directly. They cannot remain small and isolated movements with no resources to reach their government.” International coalitions, with all their tensions and advantages, cannot be by all means the panacea for the international environmental crisis—not even for the Amazon issue. They can, however, offer multiple perspectives for a crises that is both environmental and political, and to actors that more and more think and act globally.
CHAPTER FIVE

5 CASE STUDY: THE MAHOGANY CAMPAIGN

In 1992, Greenpeace officially launched an international campaign against the predatory logging of Mahogany. The campaign involved more than 80 Brazilian non-governmental organizations in a formal campaign. One of its major attributes was to link the deforestation of the Amazon to the international community. The major consumer markets of Mahogany are United States and United Kingdom, where Northern NGOs exercise great influence. The campaign counted with the organized support of a number of Northern NGOs, in Europe and in the United States. For its characteristics and the wide range of Northern and Southern organizations involved, I believe that the Mahogany Campaign is an interesting study case for this thesis.

This chapter focuses on Greenpeace with more attention than other partners in the Coalition because its role as articulator of the Brazilian coalition and its double status of International organization with a Brazilian staff (see item 3.2.5 Greenpeace). From 1991 to 1996, Greenpeace held a Latin American Forest Campaign and a Brazilian Forest Campaign, both with Brazilian officers. José Augusto Pádua, the coordinator for Latin America, was a well-known academic and environmental activist, since 1975. Anna Fanzeres, the campaigner for Brazil, was a forester with an MS from Yale. Both had strong connections with the Amazon and local organizations. The mahogany campaign was a major, although not exclusive, issue in their jobs. The campaign was subordinated to both the Greenpeace Latin America and the International Forest Campaign, initially located in the United States. In 1993,

21 From 1993 and 1995, I worked in Greenpeace as assistant to the Latin American Forest Campaign.
US Forest Campaigner, Pamela Wellner, was hired, in a selection process that counted with the participation of the Latin American Forest coordinator, Pádua. A former Rainforest Action Network officer, Wellner was supposed to organize the mahogany campaign in the US, the major consumer market. Due to the international financial crisis in Greenpeace, the US Forest Campaign was dismissed. Only in the final months of 1997, US Greenpeace initiated a hiring process for a new US Forest Campaigner.

5.1 Deforestation and Strategies

The Brazilian Legal Amazon is an approximately 5 million square kilometer area that covers the Brazilian Amazon Forest (4 million square kilometers) and transitional biomes (see section 1.2 The Amazon Rainforest: Characteristics). It includes nine Brazilian states, although integrated policies for this region are defined by the Federal Government. In 1994, only 11.8% of the Legal Amazon were deforested. Compared to other Brazilian rainforests, such as the Atlantic Coastal Forest (only 7% left), the Amazon rainforest is almost intact. The major problem is that most of deforestation has taken place in the last 30 years, due to careless development policies encouraged by the Brazilian military government (1964-1985) (Albert, 1992). In 1966, after 450 years of European colonization, only 2% of the forest were cleared. In the next twelve years, to 1978, only 1% more of the Brazilian Legal Amazon was deforested (a total deforestation of 3%). By 1994, 16 years later, an additional 6% had been cleared. Within two more years, another 1% would be deforested (see Table 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total Deforestation in SqKm</th>
<th>% Relative to Brazilian Legal Amazon (5,000,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1978</td>
<td>152,200</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1994</td>
<td>469,978</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1996</td>
<td>517,069</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recent data released by the Brazilian environmental agency, IBAMA, reveals that the decade of 1990's has imposed a heavy toll upon the forest. The Table 5.2 shows the gross deforested area in the sample years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Gross Deforestation in SqKm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978/88</td>
<td>21,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/94</td>
<td>14,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>29,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>18,161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This accelerate deforestation rate was visible by the beginning of the 1980s, and it has been confirmed by recent satellite date. Local NGOs have protested and showed concern regarding the deforestation pattern since the 1970s (see 4.2 The Other Partner: The Brazilian Environmental Movement), but only after the end of the military dictatorship, the protests were more vocal. Although farming and cattle are the principal direct causes of deforestation in the Amazon, since 1980s local studies have pointed to logging as the first cause for the advance of the deforestation frontier. The share of the Amazon in the total Brazilian timber production has been rising, from only 1.3% in 1979 to 72.1% in 1989 (Kolk, 1996, p. 73).

Logging is a key issue in the Amazon deforestation not for the number of cut trees, but because it open roads in the closed forest. These roads are used by farmer and settlers to advance further in the forest, burning new forest areas and converting them to agricultural use. Therefore, logging concurs for deforestation, through logger roads, by turning healthy forests, relatively untouched, into vulnerable forests, forests that are subject to burning and illegal settlement.
Since the second half of the 80s Brazilian environmental groups have been campaigning for the promotion of strong controls against illegal and predatory logging in the Amazon, considering these controls as an essential step to save the Amazon forest.

Since Mahogany is by far the most profitable Amazonian hardwood—with an extraction cost of roughly $42.00 for cubic meter, and prices up to $600.00 in the international market—Brazilian NGOs, such as IEA (Institute of Amazon Studies) and NDI (Nucleus for Indian Rights), focus their efforts on the control of mahogany logging.

5.2 Mahogany: The New Campaign Symbol

In 1991, when Greenpeace started its research in Amazon looking for the right approach, looking for the right approach to counter the deforestation rates, Mahogany looked like the perfect symbol for the new campaign (see Figure 5-1 — Truck with Single Mahogany Log).

Figure 5-1 — Truck with Single Mahogany Log
(RAN, 1996, photo Marco Santilli)

Mahogany (*Swietenia macrophylla*) is a highly praised tropical hardwood. It may reach 30 meter high and is widely distributed at low densities in a natural range of over 80,000 Km² (see Figure 5-2 — Mahogany Occurrence Range). Because of its size and distribution, mahogany logging requires excessive road access, with up to 400 km between forest and mill (Friend of the Earth [FoE], 1993). In 1994, 3000 km of mahogany logging roads were built in the State of
Pará (see Figure 5-3 – Mahogany Logging Roads). New agricultural frontiers were being established in the Amazon: colonists and ranchers have made use of the roads cut through previously inaccessible regions and have cleared the forests the loggers had previously opened (Monbiot, 1991; Fearnside, 1992).

The mahogany belt coincides also with the highest density of Indian reservations in the Brazilian Amazon (Figure 5-2 – Mahogany Occurrence Range). Illegal loggers invade Indian reservations as well as environmental reservations to collect the timber, with serious impact on communities. Conflicts between loggers and Indians are common, and devastating for Indians (FoE, 1993).

From an ecological point of view, Mahogany logging is also critical. Mahogany has little natural regeneration, and loggers tend to remove all the trees in one area leaving no seed supplies for regeneration. *Sweitenia macrophylla* King, or big-leaf mahogany, was added to the
official list of Brazilian species threatened with extinction in 1992. Studies in three logging areas in the Brazilian state of Pará, showed that an average of 26 trees (greater than 10 centimeters in diameter at breast height) per hectare were damaged for every tree extracted whilst loss of forest canopy averaged 38 per cent over the three sites. Road building, the movement of heavy machinery and the dragging of logs through the forest cause irreparable damage to other trees.

![Figure 5-3 -- Mahogany Logging Roads (Greenpeace, 1994)](image)

Mahogany is the most valuable timber extracted from Amazon—in some areas, it was called “green gold.” About 80% go to the international markets, mainly to US and United Kingdom markets, respectively. Both countries have strong activity of environmental NGOs—together with Netherlands and Germany, they form the basis of Greenpeace’s membership support. The mahogany campaign, thus, offered the opportunity to link the
devastation of the Amazon forest—and the suffering of the forest peoples—to unsustainable consumption patterns in the North.

In campaigns designated to capture public attention, a symbol is definitively useful. Mahogany was seen as a symbol for the damage created by the logging industry in the tropical forests.

5.2.1 The Coalition Manifesto

In 1992, Greenpeace succeeded in joining more than 70 groups (a number that would increase to 80 in the following year) into a coalition against predatory logging of mahogany. The coalition released a manifesto in October 1992, denouncing the negative impacts of mahogany logging. Most of these local NGOs had private conflict among them, and the intervention of Greenpeace, as an outside agent, was fundamental to allow these conflicts to be overlooked.

However, although also targeting to the timber industries as the major actor for the expansion of the deforestation frontier, some NGOs were more concerned with timber in general than with mahogany. Their manifesto was against predatory logging, not predatory logging of mahogany—in fact, the final title of the manifesto was *The Manifesto of the “Coalition against Predatory Logging in the Amazon”* (the text of the manifesto is found in APPENDIX II). They resisted to single out mahogany as the only species to concentrate forces on and considered a campaign commitment that other trees, more essential for their way of life (such as the Brazilnut tree) were to be included in the campaign.

The Manifesto’s first draft was written by José Pádua, and later corrected and approved by all coalition members. The text very much expresses the radical feelings of the local NGOs and at the same time shows the influence of international NGOs. This was the basis for actions in Europe and US supporting the mahogany campaign.
The Manifesto combines a nationalist appeal with considerations on the negative impacts of predatory logging in humanistic, environmental and economic point of view. The first paragraphs link the mahogany logging to “periodic cycles of predatory exploitation of natural resources took place aimed at meeting foreign needs and markets,” along five centuries of Brazilian history. “The consequence of these cycles,” the document continues, “has been always the same: environmental destruction and social impoverishment.” Fighting against the predatory logging, the text suggests, is an attempt to break this new cycle, in the best interests of the country. The document also denounces at length the destructive effects on Indian communities and in extractives reserves; the “genetic erosion” suffered by the species (when the best specimens are harvested before they can disseminate their best characteristics); the commercial extinction of mahogany in several areas; and the huge fiscal evasion existent in the logging business.

5.2.2 *The International Campaign*

The International campaign had two major fronts: to create a consumer campaign (to influence mahogany consumers) and to create controls for the mahogany international trade (see section 4.3.2 Advances and Gains).

5.2.2.1 *Consumer Campaign:* The campaign was launched in October 1992 with Greenpeace’s direct action in the Amazon - the invasion of the Magineo sawmill in the state of Pará, the biggest mahogany exporter company. By the same period the Coalition’s Manifesto was released, with a considerable impact in Brazilian public opinion. Soon after, the international campaign started with total strength. In 1993, Friends of the Earth created their mahogany campaign, called “Mahogany is Murder.” It stressed the negative effects of
mahogany logging in the local communities. Rainforest Action Network (RAN) fed its 150 associated groups—Rainforest Action Groups (RAGs)—with information and coordinated a number of demonstrations against mahogany logging in all the United States.

The concept was to affect the consumer market of mahogany. A decrease in the mahogany consumption would force producers to alter their logging practices. At the same time, Northern NGOs would lobby their own governments take measures against the importation of mahogany, and a consumption decreasing would be an important demonstration of influence. Likewise, it would help Brazilian NGOs in their bargaining with the government for better regulation against predatory logging.

A wider goal, expressed by some campaigners, was to create more awareness among consumers on the effects of their consumption patterns. Northern NGOs came from successful campaigns in altering consumer habits in the eighties, by which fur was not consider a natural symbol of class and refined taste.

The international coalition used a number of varied tactics for the mahogany campaign. Most of them were tactic already proved successful in other campaigns. For instance, press releases and folders were sent in direct mail to Northern NGOs’ members, who were asked to write letters to their congressmen. Big mahogany consumers were also targeted. After being singled by several RAN’s demonstrations and letter campaigns, in March of 1996 the US publishing company Barnes and Noble agreed to refrain from using mahogany or any other “uncertified rainforest wood” (Rainforest Action Network, 1996).

Another common practice was the “mahogany ethical shoplifting.” According to denunciations from Brazilian NGOs, most of the mahogany sold in the international market is
harvested illegally in Indian reservations or natural reserves. Northern NGOs thus direct their members to enter furniture stores, sequester any mahogany object and take it to the closest police station. The object was considered material stolen from Brazilian Indian communities, and the furniture store had to answer for buying allegedly stolen material.

These tactics were very successful in calling the attention of the media, especially during the 1993-1995. In 1993, five of the largest British do-it-yourself stores (Great Mills, Texas, BandQ, Sainsbury's Homebase and Do-It-All) agreed to stop selling Brazilian mahogany. In the same year, the biggest exporting sawmills signed a declaration that they would not do logging inside Indian lands anymore. Another agreement was signed between these sawmills and the UK National Hardwood Association, committing to trade only in legally obtained mahogany (FoE, 1998).

The agreement gave the campaign another possibility of action. It became soon clear that the declaration didn't prevent loggers from invading Indian reservations. They just contracted other small loggers to do so, and then buy the timber. Brazilian NGOs such as NDI (Nucleus of Indigenous Rights) and CIMI (Indian and Missionary Council) kept an accurate log on the illegal loggers and to whom they would sell the timber. Then, these NGOs sent the information to the Northern NGOs who would track the final buyer. The pressure was concentrated on the importer, with high broadcasting. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth claims that such tactics had a heavy impact on the consumer market; in the UK the imports dropped by 68% since 1992. It was the first consumer market in 1992, position now

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22 This information is very difficult to prove or disprove. There is not an inventory of the Amazon mahogany stands. The affirmation results from projections that estimate that the mahogany outside the Indian reservations is commercially extinct (i.e., it does not exist in enough density to be successfully harvested without invading the reservations).
held by the United States. More important than that, this tactic created a flow of information between North and Brazilian NGOs that was latter used in other campaigns.

Greenpeace also carried on some direct actions in Brazil, but for publication abroad. For dismay of its Brazilian partners, Greenpeace found out that direct actions imply some unsuspected difficulties. The first of all is the presence of the media. The concept of direct action is based on the Quaker tradition of “bear witness” to wrongdoing. Greenpeace was created in 1972 with this goal: to make the world bear witness to a nuclear test in the North Pacific, through the media. The media is also the main guarantee of safety for activists, sometimes. The secrecy of the direct actions and their need for the presence of the media creates a strategic dilemma, which is sharpened in the Amazon region. In the first direct action, in 1992, Greenpeace had to bring the reporters to the activists in a two-day travel to the action location. With no public transportation to the heart of the forest, that meant the rent of a plane from Rio de Janeiro to Marabá, PA, more than 5,000-km north and the rent of a bus—which broke in the way to the sawmill. Expensive and/or slow locomotion is common place in the Amazon, but it does not help direct actions. The characteristic of the forest itself also hinder the use of otherwise successful tactics. The canopy hides deposits of illegal logging that is hard to discover and even harder to document with dramatic photographs. In aerial pictures, the forest seems placid and intact—until it is burned for agriculture. Sometimes the only visible sign of the massive intervention of logging in the Amazon ecosystem is the transport of the heavy logs by trucks or the huge shipments of sawn mahogany in the Belém and Santarém harbors.

5.2.2.2 International Forums — CITES: From the different international environmental forums, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) has been the most relevant for the mahogany campaign. The Convention was negotiated in 1973, as a result of the United Nation Conference on Human Development, in Stockholm, 1972. It became effective in 1975 and now has 128 member countries. CITES is a binding international treaty regulating trade in wildlife and plants to help protect species threatened with extinction.

CITES has an unusual degree of NGO participation to provisions. The convention explicitly permits NGOs to participate as non-voting observers at the biennial meetings and they also receive, as registered observers, all documentation pertaining to the upcoming meetings. NGOs attend plenary sessions and most committee meetings. And, as it turns out, NGOs, both conservation and trade-oriented groups, contribute considerable time and financial resources to CITES for enforcement and implementation. They have developed publicity materials for CITES, printed export permits for Bolivia and Paraguay, done population studies on a number of species, and conducted training seminars for officials from the management authorities of less-developed countries. Many conduct their own investigations of illegal trading and, if necessary, fund funding delegates of poorer organizations to participate in the meetings (Princen, 1994, p. 142).

Species under CITES's protection are listed in three Appendices. Appendix I lists species threatened with extinction - they are thus banned from international trade, except for scientific conservation. Appendix II lists species on the verge of becoming so if exploitation and trade are not regulated - trade is permitted insofar as it does not threaten their continued survival. Appendix III (added in 1995) is for species that member countries are regulating by themselves and for which they ask for collaboration from the other members. Species may be proposed for listing even if they do not occur in the proponent country, although the proposal should be accept by two thirds of member countries. In some way, CITES is a multilateral
agreement where one country may propose environmental regulation to other countries
without offending the concept of sovereignty (United Nations, 1993).

According to Pádua (1997), "since 1991 the tropical forests defense movement has been campaigning for the listing of mahogany at the Appendix II of Cites. Although this listing is not the final solution— and cannot substitute internal policies in the Amazon countries and consumer responsibility in the importing countries — there is a consensus among specialists that it would help a lot in the promotion of strong controls against the industry.” The listing in CITES’ Appendix II would have forced the Brazilian government to establish durable policies to control the logging industry and these controls would be complemented by measures taken by the importing countries. Moreover, under the rule of an international agreement, these controls should be kept in the future, independent from temporary measures promoted by particular officers or cabinets. According to the CITES’ Appendix II, the producer countries must provide a certificate that the timber exported does not come from illegal sources. Therefore, the listing would also force the government to fight against the non-registered activities and extend its controls beyond the official logging industry. It would also help the NGOs on the importing countries to make pressure over their governments to only accept mahogany coming from true sustainable sources.

The big-leaf mahogany has been proposed for listing successively in the CITES Conference of Parties in 1991 Kyoto, Japan; 1994 Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and 1997 Harare, Zimbabwe. The proposal has been withdrawn or defeated in all occasions, although for a small margin.

However, the simple fact that mahogany was proposed for the Appendix II of CITES had big consequences in the mahogany campaign and in the CITES itself, as we see below. Although CITES prides itself on basing the inclusion of a species in one of its Appendices on
pure scientific criteria, the Convention has been more and more politicized. In the past, CITES has not listed in its Appendix II timber species that could have a strong impact on the trade. Susan Lieberman of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service points out that the elephant question overwhelmed everything else at the 1989 CITES meeting. Ronald Orenstein (1997), international officer of the International Coalition, said that the timber lobby monopolized the debate in Fort Lauderdale in 1993. In 1997, it was even worse: countries that wanted the end of the ivory ban (for instance, Zimbabwe) allied themselves to the countries who wanted to avoid the listing of mahogany (for instance, Brazil) and to the countries who wanted to reject the connection between CITES and the International Whaling Commission (for instance, Japan; the connection was accepted) joined effort in what some environmentalists called “an unholy alliance.” It is obvious that if CITES gains in importance by regulating commercially significant species, it also is more vulnerable to commercial interests and maneuvers.

NGOs are not above political maneuvers themselves. If listed, Mahogany would be the first timber species with high value and a relevant place at the international market on CITES' Appendix II. This measure could open a precedent for the future listing of other species like the Khayas genera (Africa) and Ramin (Southeast Asia). Therefore, the use of Cites as a conservation tool could open new strategic possibilities for the defense of the tropical forests, and the NGOs—as well as the government and the timber industry—are aware of that.

Independent of the final results at the CITES Conference of the Parties, the presence of the mahogany campaign at CITES resulted in two interest consequences for the coalition: first, a vigorous flow of scientific information; second, Brazilian domestic regulations such as the Mahogany Moratorium Decree, in 1996 (see item 5.1).
5.2.2.3 The Flow of Science Information: The 1994 CITES meeting in Fort Lauderdale counted with a singular amount of scientific material on mahogany produced by NGOs. In fact, the material produced then is still the basis for the campaign, except by the new information gathered by the Friends of the Earth. In 1994, "Faith Campbell from Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) was a key person to move the work, collecting and sharing information" with NGOs in the US and Brazil (Pádua, 1997, par. 15). The NRDC proposal included information on mahogany produced by US think tanks and it was widely spread among the Brazilian NGOs.

The flow of information was also from the South to the North. In 1993, after strong lobby by more than 137 US groups led by the Rainforest Action Network, the United States Government decided to propose the inclusion of mahogany in the Appendix II, which, being the US the major consumer market, had strong effect in the Conference.23 The US proposal used a great deal of information produced by NGOs, from North and South. For instance, regarding the area of distribution of the species, the Brazilian government insisted in the figure of 1,500,000 sq. km, provided by some conservative studies; the US proposal calculates the same area, for use of sustainable logging purposes, in 800,000 Sq.Km. Anna Fanzeres, the Brazilian Forest Campaigner, calculated the 800,000 Sq.Km. figure for Greenpeace. The argument, supported by Brazilian NGOs, was is that although mahogany may exist along 1,500,000 Sq.Km., this whole figure should not be considered for conservation purposes. It should subtract the protected areas and the areas where the species' density is not enough to be explored. By doing so, we obtain the 800,000 Sq.Km figure.

23 In the previous meeting the proposal had been done by Netherlands, which is not a significant mahogany importer.
This flow of information has somehow decreased for the 1997 CITES meeting. Greenpeace, for instance, reduced its mahogany campaign and its tropical forests work after 1995, and in 1997 it did not have a forest campaigner working in Brazil. Friends of the Earth entered more actively on the issue, and released an important report just before the 1997 CITES meeting, called *Forest Management at Loggerheads* (Pádua, 1997, par. 35).

5.2.3 **Mahogany Moratorium Decree**

On July 26, 1996, the Brazilian President Cardoso determined a number of measures (Brazil 1996 and Brazil 1996a) -- named “the Amazon Package” or “the Mahogany Moratorium” -- in order to control the rampant deforestation rates in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. These measures have immediate law status, although Brazilian Congress should approve them later. The “Mahogany Moratorium” came about as the country’s National Institute of Space Research (INPE) announced that deforestation had reached 14,896 SqKm/year in 1994, up from 11,130 in 1991. Official estimates indicate that deforestation increased 33% between 1991 and 1994 (IBAMA, 1996a). Further studies by the INPE would confirm the trend: the deforestation in 1995 was two times bigger than in 1994.

The mahogany moratorium was a result of the mahogany campaign as a whole. It was also an attempt to prove that the listing of mahogany in the Appendix II of CITES was unnecessary, because Brazil had already taken the necessary measures to assure sustainable logging.

By the “Mahogany Moratorium,” the Brazilian government decided to declare, in July 1996, a 2 years moratorium on the concession of new permits for mahogany logging. It also defined stricter rules for conversion of land use and started an auditing process on the logging management plans officially registered in the Amazon. The first results of this process were
released in January 1997. From the 3,700 existing management plans the federal environment agency—IBAMA—was able to make an initial investigation on 845. From this initial universe of management plans 190 were canceled, 353 were temporarily suspended (waiting for more detailed investigation) and 302 were confirmed. The projection is that by the end of this process around 70% of the existing management plans will be suspended or canceled.

The decree was greeted by the local and international NGOs as a positive result of the mahogany campaign—"we must remember," says Pádua (1997), "that the Brazilian government did nothing about the problem until the campaign started to get a good public profile." However, the decree still falls short from a final and true solution for the logging problem. "The first results of the auditing process shows that the vast majority of the official logging practices in the Amazon is happening against the law. The essential point, however, is that we are talking here only of the officially registered logging activities. If these ones are already very bad we can imagine the situation with the big number of illegal logging activities happening in the Amazon. The auditing is ignoring the last ones. If fact, according to the local informants, what is happening is that the registered companies did quit the Indian reserves after 1993, but they were substitute by non registered groups that keep doing the same job. And everybody knows that the timber logged by these non-registered groups is sold to the big companies. When the denounces are released the registered companies blame the behavior of the non registered ones (the so called 'timber diggers'), but extra-officially they support it."

The Mahogany Moratorium was also an admission by the Brazilian Government that the mahogany campaign—so often called an "imported agenda" or a "unduly interference in national affairs"—had on the contrary pointed out in the right direction regarding the devastation of the Amazon. The moratorium in fact answers to some of the oldest request by Brazilian NGOs. On the other hand, it was the major rational used by the Brazilian
Government against the listing of mahogany in the Appendix II of CITES. Last but not least, the Moratorium was a Brazilian Government's answer to the massive introduction of Malaysian sawmills in the Amazon logging industry.

5.3 Campaign Assessment

Any assessment of the Mahogany Campaign as whole would be limited. As a study case, however, the Mahogany Campaign includes all the important elements existent in a coalition between North and South NGOs. First, we must recognize the impossibility of transfer without major adaptations campaign strategies that are successful in Northern Countries. The complexity of issues in the Amazon, and the characteristics of the Amazon itself, challenge the traditional activist profile of a single environmental interest and little regard for the social conditions.

It is not possible to assess if the campaign had an effective impact on the deforestation rates. The deforestation has accelerated in the last years, but this is due to a complex combinations of factors—that could include from the Brazilian economic situation to the introduction of Malaysian sawmills in the Amazon. However, the major victory of the campaign was to put mahogany logging in particular, and all unsustainable logging in general, in every debate on trade and timber across the planet—Intergovernmental Panel of Forests, International Trade Timber Organization, Forest Stewardship Council, and others.

This chapter has focused more on the relationship between North and South NGOs. However, a full account of the mahogany campaign should study the acceptance—or rejection—by other local players. Workers, for instance, are very much split on the issue. Sawmill owners and sawmill workers are the most likely to suffer directly from the “Mahogany Moratorium.” The industry is also responsible for about 15,000 direct and indirect jobs. The
effective closure of the illegal or irregular logging may cause an employment crisis. Farmers and landless peasants are also likely to be affected. The mahogany logging roads have provided in the last 20 years a safety valve for land conflicts in the boundaries of the Amazon Forest. Landless peasants are pushed into the jungle so they burn the forest and set the first crops. Usually, later this land is informally bought by the farmers, and peasants move again even more deeply into the forest (Fearnside, 1992). Closing this safety valve will probably bring about conflicts hitherto delayed.

Worker unions, however, have welcome the campaign. In fact, among the signatories of the Manifesto against Predatory Logging, there are at least 17 worker unions. They represent, for instance, rubber tapers, forest workers who live from non-wood products. The non-wood forest productive reserves have been heavily threatened by illegal logging in the last seven years. According to the Council of Rubber Tapers, mahogany logging jeopardizes any attempt at sustainable economic activities, such as Brazilnuts and rubber harvesting, in the Amazon Forest (Coalizão, 1992).

The Campaign also showed some fears by local NGOs of being used by international NGOs, or that the victories of the campaign would be capitalized by the latter. At least in one occasion, these fears were not unfounded. In 1996, just after the signature of the Mahogany Moratorium, Greenpeace issued two press releases that “typically claim most of the credit for Greenpeace.” According to the releases, the director of the Brazilian Environmental Agency had recognized the Moratorium as a “Greenpeace victory”—and this is how Greenpeace called the Moratorium, with no or little reference to the Coalition. The reaction was almost immediate. Glen Barry (1996), a rainforest activist, protested in the electronic list rainforest.general that “noting Greenpeace’s contributions, we know that the call for a moratorium on mahogany has been a major rallying point for the rainforest movement; and
the dozens of groups working on this issue in Brazil and internationally, we all deserve our
due.” The coalition itself, however, did not exist anymore. The protests against Greenpeace’s
arrogance do not make any reference to it. In the same electronic list, Truda Pallazo (1996), a
Brazilian activist of International Wildlife Coalition, is more acid regarding Greenpeace,
although he attributes the moratorium more to some Brazilian government officials than to
Brazilian NGOs: “It would be very unfortunate,” says Palazzo, to have foreign NGOs parting
their respective backs without openly recognizing the courageous and rather lonely efforts of
concerned Brazilian officials like Mr. Beninca de Salles [an IBAMA officer].” This remark is
even more ironic when we note that the International Wildlife Coalition is a signatory of the
Coalition Against Predatory Logging of Mahogany since 1993.

Another issue that the Coalition brought up was the relationship between Brazilian
NGOs and the Government. Since 1993 some NGOs had been called to take part in meetings
with the Brazilian environmental agency regarding the mahogany logging. Most of the NGOs
called to take part in these meeting had links with international NGOs. Although these
meetings have became are more common with the consolidation of the Brazilian democracy,
the NGOs were not yet able to establish strong links of pressure in their own government, as
it was seen during the CITES meetings. For instance, the Forum of Brazilian NGOs and
Social Movements for Environment and Development, during its general meeting in Brasilia,
supported the listing of mahogany in the Appendix II and asked the coordination to take the
necessary measures for this campaign. Two Brazilian Congress representatives (Senator Marina
Silva form Acre State, a former Chico Mendes partner, and MP Gilney Vianna from Mato
Grosso state) also lobbied in favor of the listing. They did not succeed, however, into
transforming the issue into a common effort by Brazilian NGOs in the months before the
CITES meeting.
The campaign also had to deal with the nationalism that permeates any discussion on the Amazon Rainforest. Returning from the Cites Conference of Parties in Harare, Gilberto Martins, president of the Brazilian environmental agency, complains that the Brazilian NGOs deal with an imported agenda, with no regard for the true Brazilian priorities. In this view, mahogany would be only the last “oriented fashion [symbol of an international environmental movement] that has already had symbols such as the lion-monkey, the elephant and now the mahogany.” Martins touched a sensitive key, because the local NGOs themselves feel uncomfortable with allies that change their support according to the latest interest of their donor members. The Brazilian answer in a national magazine was to remember that the government had always tried to gain more legitimacy by looking for the advice of the NGOs, now accused of non-patriotic. Besides, Martins himself had stressed the importance of controlling mahogany in the previous year, during the signature of the mahogany moratorium, and had been a strong supporter for the mahogany listing in 1994, when he was the president of the World Wildlife Foundation – Brazil. There was not, in any of these answers, any mention to the multiyear campaign against predatory mahogany logging led by Brazilian NGOs even before the coalition with international NGOs.

This answer seems to point out that although the coalition has the potential to bring advantages to both North and South partners, Southern partners are less used to politically capitalize the existence of this coalition in their own benefit.

The context of the mahogany campaign has changed in the last two years, and this new context should define the next steps. First, the downsizing of Greenpeace left an empty space in the articulation of the campaign that has been fulfilled by the Friends of the Earth. The strategies, however, have been similar. Until 1993 Friends of the Earth was more involved with the Multilateral Development Bank Campaign (see item 3.2, The Amazon Forest Enters the
US NGOs’ Agenda). Currently it has a local staff and a Brazilian office, and strong links with local NGOs. It has released scientific studies and articulated new coalitions. Friends of the Earth has, however, re-started from the scratch, without recurring to the former Coalition Against Predatory Logging. It lacks, until this moment, the expressive support of Indian Rights organizations and worker Unions that were present in the former Coalition.

Second, the new presence of Malaysian sawmills in the Amazon (and the new and appalling deforestation rates data) should revitalize the campaign. Moreover, now with the nationalist argument should count in favor of the NGOs. If, in the past, there was a national logger and a foreign consumer, now there is a foreign logger disputing or joining with the national businessman. It will be interesting to see how the international and local environmental movement will act in this new correlation of forces. There are already some signs of revitalization of the campaign: The Globo, one of the biggest Brazilian Newspaper, and the VEJA, the biggest Brazilian magazine, have both prepared special series on the deforestation of the Amazon, in December 1997 and March 1998. In both cases, the Malaysian sawmills are pointed out as the new “bad guys” in a long story.
CHAPTER SIX

6 CONCLUSION

This study focused on the action of US NGOs\textsuperscript{34} in the Brazilian Amazon and the representation (see 1.1 Methodology) of the Amazon created as a result of such action. Some of the conclusions in the previous chapters will be summarized below.

The Amazon has been presented in the American mentalité since the 18th century, through the first reports by visiting naturalists. From the first, science has been an important element in the understanding of the Amazon in America. Other representations added new elements along the years—the question of resource control, untamed wilderness, the place of the wonderful and the bizarre. These overlapping and sometimes contradictory representations had in common the fact that they projected upon the Amazon their own ideas on what the region was or should be. The American mentalité greatly disregarded the plans or conceptions that the Amazonian and its inhabitants may have had about themselves. The representation created by US NGOs over the last three two decades through their activity in Amazon may be different from these previous representations, because of the particular characteristics of the non-governmental organizations, because of the concrete history of their activity in the Amazon, and because of their strategic choices, such as the coalition with local NGOs.

The coalition between US and Brazilian NGOs was possible but not conflict-free. International environmental politics is also deeply entwined in a North-South conflict, and the coalition could not but bear effects of this conflict. They came from different, although not

\textsuperscript{34} This study has focused most on US NGOs or NGOs with strong influence on the American mentalité. However, we have used the concept of "Northern" and "US" NGOs almost as interchangeable, although we have pointed out the larger influence of public opinion on US NGOs.
incompatible, environmentalist traditions, and had different historical and political backgrounds. The use of simplified images of the Amazon—as in the case of a myth of "ecologically noble savage"—can repeat the pattern of projection and misrepresentation found in the earlier narratives of the Amazon. On the other hand, due to these misrepresentations, US and Brazilian NGOs may find themselves at odds regarding their goals and strategies. Should the emphasis be in the control of the resources or the conservation of the resources?

The coalition is not a panacea for all Amazon problems, even for the single problem of deforestation. As American environmentalist John Muir (1911, 157) said, "when we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe." It is not different with the Amazon. A whole range of complex issues is linked to the deforestation of region, and they imply a likewise complex range of solutions, from the strengthening of the communication between Brazilian NGOs and Government, to resolution of land conflict in the border of the Amazon. Coalitions between US and Brazilian NGOs, however, have been an important multipath strategic tool to address some urgent questions for the Amazon.

Non-governmental organizations press governments to change rules. They may also act indirectly, by targeting people and their actions toward Nature. In this case, NGOs' activities take place in the so-called "global civil society," by the international relations scholar P. Wapner (1997). "Civil society is that arena of social engagement which exists above the individual yet below the state. It is a complex network of economics, social, and cultural practices based in friendship, family, the market, and voluntary affiliation." NGOs act in this realm—in fact, they are sometimes called "civil society organizations"—and it has been a traditional concept for analysis of domestic societies. Recently, it has been applied to a global level. "The interpenetration of markets, the intermeshing of symbolic meaning systems, and the proliferation of transnational collective endeavors signal the formation of a thin, but
nevertheless present, public sphere where private individuals and groups interact for common purposes.... When transnational activists direct their efforts beyond the state, they are politicizing global civil society” (Wapner, 1997, p. 233).

The arrival of US NGOs in the Amazon, in the 1980s, brought this global civil society to an already complex national civil society. The result has been an interweaving of economic, political, and social cooperation and conflict manifest at a number of different levels: in “pitting local groups against the apparatus of the state and those who control it (agencies, developers, political élites); in cooperation between local movements and environmental organizations from outside the region; in conflicts among competing levels of political jurisdiction (local, national, and multilateral); and in pressures for intergovernmental cooperation (or perhaps more accurately, regulated competition and conflict)” (Conca & Lipschutz, 1993, p. 3).

Influencing representations of the environment—and in this case, of the Amazon—is not just a by-product of NGO action. It may often be their major purpose, and, due to their special dependence of public opinion, sometimes a matter of survival. NGOs may confirm and reinforce values already existent in the current representations. Or they may challenge hegemonic values, values and understandings that are relatively stable and unquestioned and appear to most actors as the natural order. NGOs have, therefore, the potential to be “counter-hegemonic” players, by challenging consumption patterns or questioning the decision making process of multilateral agencies.

For Brazilian NGOs, this counter-hegemonic potential was a tempting promise to have their values brought to global levels through alliances with US NGOs. To bring into effect this counter-hegemonic, however, US NGOs had to overcome their “democratic
deficit” (see item 3.3.2). They had to legitimate their “diplomate niche,” a niche that is defined by the NGOs’ ability to forge links local questions to global issues, and vice-versa.

In the Brazilian Amazon, this “linking local to global” implied into building coalitions with local organizations. Coalition was a favored strategy because it provided the necessary legitimacy for US NGOs’ counter-hegemonic potential, and because it would increase the efficiency of NGOs’ declared goal, for instance, fighting primarily the deforestation in the Amazon.

The coalition strategy thus could serve both partners. The legitimacy of the action of American environmental NGOs in the Amazon would be stronger if such action is also the product of local concerns. Local NGOs could be empowered in their local efforts through the support of American NGOs.

Roberto Smeraldi (online interview, 1998 March 16), the Friends of the Earth’s Amazon Program coordinator, suggested that there is much to gain by both partners in the coalition if they broaden their understanding of the Amazon, an understand that would encompass the Amazon as a region, with different socio-economic issues and with different environmental dimension. Environmentalists have always insisted that a forest is much more than timber resources and trees: it has singular ecological and thermodynamic process. Maybe it is time for US NGOs to understand fully that the Amazon is also more than a forest: it has singular social, environmental, cultural and political processes.

6.1 Findings

Representations of the Amazon are, by definition, mental constructions. These constructs are defined and shaped by the cultural point of view (or mentalité) of the different actors. It is equally important to note that the same representations can also shape this mentalité. Being
subjective does not prevent the representations from creating and sponsoring public policies. That is why it is so relevant to track and understand their process of birth and gestation.

In addition, one of the most important points in the comparison between Northern and Southern environmentalists is the place of the environment in ordinary life. For most Southern communities in the Amazon, environmental concern means the response to essential and basic needs, and control of the natural resources needed for everyday life. In this case, environmentalism is not an “extra” concern, or a “full belly” concern. It is survival.

Of course, this approach does not necessarily imply the preservation of the environment in traditional Northern environmentalist terms; it only shows the significance of environmental resources for the communities in the forest.

Finally, this study shows that North and South coalitions are essential for defining and advocating responsible and effective policies for the Amazon region. However, these coalitions do have an element of inequality that could drive them to undesired developments (manipulation, imperialism and dominance by one of the partners). Therefore, the coalitions should be under continuous scrutiny by the partners involved and their supporters.

6.2 Future Research

This study explored some questions for future research opportunities. For instance, this thesis pointed out the particularity of the Brazilian social context in which the local NGOs were created. In this context, social and environmental movements have the same roots, and environmental struggles cannot be dissociated from social demands. Therefore, NGOs in Brazil that focus on social development share the same limelight with women’s organizations, Indian right’s groups and environmental groups (see item 4.2 The Other Partner: The Brazilian Environmental Movement). In contrast, US environmental NGOs devoted their attention
primarily to environmental issues. However, this cultural and political contrast between US and Brazilian NGOs is similar to other dichotomies, such as between US mainstream environmental and grassroots organizations, as well as between the poor Brazilian North and the rich Brazilian South. Some studies on different environmentalist traditions have been carried on by the American scholars Gottlieb (1992) and Pulido (1996), and by Guha and Martinez-Allier (1997). However, most of these studies have stressed the differences between such traditions. Future studies could cover the experiences of collaboration between these traditions and the limits of these collaborations.

The case of the Amazon may offer guidelines for the development of environmental international actions out of a multicultural basis. These may include North and South environmentalism, subaltern social movements (Pulido, 1996) and mainstream organizations, and biocentric and anthropocentric environmental traditions. It may also help to shape NGO policies toward other global environmental problems, such as biodiversity and the conservation of global commons, problems that also involve a complex web of sometimes conflicting and sometimes legitimate interests.

The question of NGOs' legitimacy in global environmental politics deserves a more comprehensive study than what was presented here. International relations scholars, such as Wapner (1997), Conka and Lipschutz (1993a) and other have explored the theme. It is not clear in their studies, however, whether environmental global NGOs have a different platform of legitimacy than other transnational NGOs (such as gender or development NGOs) due to their link with science, a fundamental legitimating agent for environment issues.

The methods used in this research proved to be rich and robust for the verification of our hypothesis. Future research would especially benefit from further use of structured interviews for multicultural sources.
This research has focused more on the US side of the Amazon coalitions. Future research could explore better the Brazilian side of these coalitions, and the effect that this experience had on the Brazilian NGOs' action and policies.

6.3 Significance

The current globalization of the world makes more and more frequent the meeting of agents with different cultural backgrounds in international environmental forums. Moreover, the transboundary characteristics of environmental issues themselves point to the increasing interaction of such agents, troubled by common questions.

The experience of coalitions in the Amazon rainforest, presented by this thesis, offers a possible guideline to understand and optimize such interactions, by taking into account ecological pre-conditions and social/cultural imperatives.
APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW WITH OFFICERS OF US NGOS

The following questions were sent by email on September 15, 1998 to the interviewees. The answers were collected between October 1997 and March 1998. The interview is composed in three parts: a brief identification of the officer; general information on the organization and a longer questionnaire on their action and thoughts about the Brazilian Amazon. The interview ends with an overall assessment of the organization’s action in the Amazon.

Except for Schwartzman and Borges, whose interviews were conducted by phone, all the other officers answered the questions by email. The list of interviewees and dates when the interviews were conducted is in OTHER REFERENCES.

The structured interviews were used mainly in Chapters 3, Thinking Globally, Acting Globally, and 4, Coalition: A Network Made of Conflict, Diversity and Alliances.

Officer
1. Complete name
2. Job description at the Organization
3. Brief background (Academic Graduation, previous experience in Amazon, how you would like to be described).
4. How were you hired by this organization?

Organization
1. Name and foundation year.
2. Where does it have its headquarters?
3. How is the representation in the US? How is the representation in Brazil or other Amazon Countries?
4. How is the NGOs' activities funded? (contribution of members, projects, Governmental funding, or other)
5. How do you divulge your activities? (WWW, Newsletter, normal Media--actions, release of studies, other)
Amazon

1. How and when did your organization decided to establish a camping on the Amazon rainforest? Could you explain a bit of the decision making process?

2. Which factors were more relevant for the starting of an Amazon campaign in your organization (please give a value to each one of the factors below and/or suggest others)? In other words, why is the Amazon relevant for your organization?
   - Biodiversity
   - Forest for itself
   - Forest people's situation
   - Forest Sustainability experiences
   - Future uses for medicine
   - Greenhouse effect

3. And which factors were more relevant to you?

4. What are the major issues of the campaign?
   - Animal trade
   - Consumption patterns
   - Deforestation rates
   - Indians rights
   - Mahogany
   - Others (please specify)
   - Sustainability

5. What is the relationship of your organization with local NGOs? And with local governments?

6. How does your organization act inside USA?
   - Direct action
   - Public awareness campaign
   - Lobby
   - Others (please exemplify)

7. Have you notice any change of perspective on the way your organization deals with Amazon issues, since you have entered the organization?
   - Loss or gain of importance of the Amazon as an issue.
   - Loss or gain of importance of any of the factors mentioned before

8. Have you noticed any kind of difficulty of relationship with the local NGOs? Why? Can you exemplify?

9. Some consider the concern of non-local NGOs on the Amazon issue an undue intrusion of foreigners in the local countries' sovereignty. Have you faced this argument before? Being a Brazilian officer in a transnational NGO, how do you deal with it?

10. How do you see the Amazon campaign in a context of conflict between North and South? How do you see the action of your organization in this context? How do you see your action in this context?
1. This year marks the 500th anniversary of Europeans coming to the Americas. This is the right time for a deep and critical evaluation of the course followed by the societies that devolved from European contact with the peoples and nature of this region. Regarding the relationship of Brazilian society with the environment, the evaluation of these centuries can be defined as a real tragedy. During this period cycles of predatory exploitation of natural resources took place aimed at meeting foreign needs and markets. The consequences of these cycles have been always the same: environmental destruction and social impoverishment.

2. In Brazil the exploitation of Pau Brasil, a red timber and dye, was the first mark of this cruel process. Its consequences are well-known: the disorderly occupation of the territory, the cultural disintegration of indigenous populations, the destruction of forest ecosystems, the extinction of species and the dilapidation of natural resources. This took place for the benefit of a selfish elite and their international partners. (Pau Brasil became commercially extinct in the first century of colonization).

3. Today, five centuries later, we can realize how much this pattern of exploitation, referred to as development, is still present. The Amazon region provides many examples of this pattern of development and is still submitted to an irrational process of devastation and disorderly occupation. Already 415,000 square kilometers of the Brazilian Amazon have been deforested, about equivalent in size to Germany. The fruits of this devastation are more than questionable: the destruction of tens of indigenous cultures, huge unproductive farms generating very few jobs, illegal and highly polluting gold mining projects, colonists with abysmal living conditions and the advance of prostitution and drug dealing.

Instead of recognizing these mistakes and taking up ecologically viable projects in the areas already deforested (such as agrarian reform, ecological agriculture and forest restoration) the agricultural frontier continues to push into primary forest areas reproducing the same mistakes of the past. As affirmed by the signatories to this Manifesto, colonists prefer to settle in the vast areas already cleared from the forest and do not wish to be pushed into the jungle where living conditions are much harder. It makes no sense to destroy more virgin forest when the result of the deforestation promoted so far are totally absurd in terms of ecological and economic aspects.

4. It is ironic that one of the major economic forces that continues this destructive and disordered penetration of the Amazon forest is very similar to the activity that extinguished Pau Brasil in the beginning of the colonization of Brazil. Today, the logging industry, and especially Mahogany logging, seriously threatens the future of much of the Amazon forest.

5. Mahogany is the most valuable Brazilian timber sold on the international market. The species is found over a huge area of the southern Amazon covering much of the states of Pará,
Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Rondonia and Acre. The big sawmill owners who pay for the search and extraction of this "green gold" do not consider how their industry leads to the degradation and eventual complete destruction of primary forest areas. Mahogany is a rare tree and its exploitation requires loggers to move into more and more remote forest areas each year. More than 3,000 kilometers of major roads and tens of thousands of kilometers of secondary roads have been illegally pushed in the southern Amazon in the last ten years to extract Mahogany. After cutting out all marketable Mahogany in a given area the logging companies move on, leaving their access roads for colonists, gold miners and displaced poor who consolidate the destruction of the forest. The exploitation of timber in general and the cutting of Mahogany in particular are the driving force leading to forest destruction in the southern Amazon today.

6. Most of the Mahogany extracted in Brazil is taken from the territories of indigenous peoples. There are numerous reports of Mahogany trees being cut down and removed from indigenous lands despite resistance of Indian communities against this usurpation of their territory. At the same time, strong pressure and the allurement of Indian leaders - sometimes with the assistance of Funai employees - has led some indigenous communities to sign contracts allowing the extraction of Mahogany on their lands. These agreements, however, have not been approved by the relevant government authorities and are legally invalid. Such timber deals have often led to the political fragmentation and cultural degradation of Indian groups. These communities learn by example that ecological destruction through over-exploitation of the forest is the only alternative that can allow them access to outside assistance and consumer goods.

In the last ten years the number of indigenous communities that have become victims of the Mahogany boom has more than doubled. The problem is bound to get worse as almost all the remaining stands of Mahogany are located inside indigenous territories. The lack of enforcement from Funai and IBAMA, the federal environment agency, has encouraged the illegal exploitation of Mahogany from indigenous land from logging companies. Over the last two years in the state of Para, the bulk of all Mahogany produced comes from trees illegally extracted from indigenous lands.

7. The ecological impacts of the Mahogany industry are equally serious. Areas of protected forest such as the Biological Reserve of Guaporé in Rondonia and the Extractive Reserve Chico Mendes in Acre have been systematically invaded by Mahogany loggers. National Parks throughout the region have also been violated. Due to intense exploitation, the Amazonian Mahogany species, Sweitenia macrophylla King was added to the official list of Brazilian species threatened with extinction in 1992. There is some debate regarding how close the species is to extinction but the fact remains that if left unchecked, the current pattern of exploitation of Mahogany will drive the species to extinction in the Amazon in a few short years.

Wherever the Mahogany exploitation frontier has passed, the species has become practically extinct. In the 1960s, Mahogany was extracted in the Araguaia region of Para. After the commercial extinction of the species in this region, the loggers moved forward along the highway PA 150. During the 1980s this same predatory pattern moved into the occidental part of Amazonia towards the Xingu River. Today the Mahogany loggers have already crossed the Xingu and keep advancing.
In addition to the role that logging roads play in opening up primary forest to other destructive influences, Mahogany logging itself causes considerable ecological damage. Studies show that for each cut tree around 28 other trees are killed and some 1,450 square meters of forest are damaged. The few attempts at growing the species in plantations in the Amazon are still in their early stages and only occupy a small area when compared with the amount of forest damaged by the industry each year. To date, none of the plantations have demonstrated the ability to overcome attacks of the moth (Hypsipella grandella) common in commercial Mahogany plantations. Such plantations are often used to justify the continuation of the Mahogany industry in natural forests rather than a real search for concrete alternatives to forest destruction.

8. Despite all the problems mentioned above there are people and companies still defending the exploitation of Mahogany as a source of economic development for the Brazilian Amazon. Even this argument must be contested. The Mahogany industry is made up of an extensive chain of informal actors and middlemen who are controlled by a small elite group of sawmills and exporters. The industry generates relatively few jobs and the bulk of the profits are made in the importing countries or in the southeast of Brazil. The Mahogany sawmills belong to business groups which moved to Amazonia after exhausting the timber resources in the Atlantic Coast Rainforests and the Araucaria forests in the South of Brazil.

In addition to the impunity with which Mahogany loggers still operate in nature reserves and on indigenous lands, there are strong indications that the industry includes a substantial number of companies engaging in tax fraud through concealing information regarding the source and the correct volume of extracted logs.

9. Given the seriousness of the economic, ecological and social impact of the industry and the clear evidence that Mahogany extraction is perpetuating and intensifying the chaotic model of occupation in Amazonia to the detriment of Brazilian society, the following groups, many of which deal directly with this problem, have formulated the following demands:

10. A) That the Brazilian government through its competent institutions must face up to this problem by prohibiting all cutting and trade of Mahogany in the Amazon region until it has evaluated the extent of damage caused by the industry to date, and defined through a wide debate among all interested parties the legal measures necessary to halt this chaotic process.

This measure is necessary to achieve the following objectives: a) Mahogany loggers do not build illegal and inadequate roads into primary forest areas, and that existing logging roads are used appropriately or closed; b) all exploitation of Mahogany trees in areas designated for ecological preservation is halted; c) all exploitation of Mahogany in indigenous areas and extractive reserves is halted and at the same time the government concretely supports the efforts of the forest peoples and communities to find economic and non-predatory alternatives for their survival and development; d) the dynamic of predatory logging leading to the extinction of species in areas reached by Mahogany exploitation is stopped.

B) That the solution of the problems caused by the Mahogany industry must be seen as the first step in the implementation of policies and programs to end all forms of predatory logging in Amazonia. This policy on Mahogany should serve as a guide to transform all logging activities throughout the region; including restricting the areas where logging is allowed,
defining rigidly the technical conditions acceptable for logging operations, halting the violation of protected areas and indigenous territories, and enforcing prohibitions on the cutting of species forbidden by law such as the Brazil-nut tree.

NGOs signing the Manifesto of the "Coalition against Predatory Logging in the Amazon" (November 12):

Ação Ecológica Vale do Guaporé: ECOPORE (Rondonia)
Associação de Proteção Ambiental e Recuperação de Áreas Indígenas: APARAI (Rondonia)
Associação Profissional dos Engenheiros Florestais do Rio de Janeiro: APEIFERJ (Rio de Janeiro)
AWARU: Organização de Apoio ao Povo Nambikwara (Rondonia)
Casa da Cultura de Marabá (Pará)
Centro Agroambiental do Tocantins: CAT (Pará)
Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e Informação: CEDI (São Paulo)
Centro de Educação, Pesquisa e Assessoria Popular: CEPASP (Pará)
Centro de Trabalho Indigenista: CTI (São Paulo)
Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros (Acre e Pará)
Centro de Educação Indígena: CMEI (São Paulo)
Centro de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos (Amazonas)
Centro Ecumênico de Estudos Bíblicos: CEBI (Amazonas)
Centro dos Trabalhadores da Amazônia: CTI (Acre)
Centro de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos e Educação Popular: CDDHEP (Acre)
Comitê Chico Mendes (Acre)
Comissão pela Criação do Parque Yanomami: CCPY (São Paulo)
Comissão Pro-Índio de Acre (Acre)
Comissão Pro-Índio de São Paulo: CPI/SP (São Paulo)
Comissão Pastoral da Terra do Acre: CPT/AC (Acre)
Comissão Pastoral da Terra de Rondônia: CPT/RO (Rondonia)
Comissão Pastoral da Terra do Amazonas: CPT/AM (Amazonas)
Comissão Pastoral da Terra do Pará e Amapá: CPT/PA (Pará)
Conselho Indigenista Missionário Nacional: CIMI/Nac (Brasil)
Conselho Indigenista Missionário do Norte I: CIMI/Norte I (Pará)
Conselho Indigenista Missionário do Norte II: CIMI/Norte II (Amazonas)
Conselho Indigenista Missionário: Regional Rondônia
Conselho de Missão entre os Índios da Igreja de Confissão Luterana do Brasil (Rio Grande do Sul)
Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira: COIAB (Amazonas)
Central Única dos Trabalhadores do Sudeste do Pará (Pará)
Delegacia dos Urbanitários de Marabá (Pará)
Ecoforça (São Paulo)
Fórum das Organizações Não-Governamentais que Atuam em Rondônia (Rondônia)
Fundação de Apoio à Vida nos Trópicos
ECOTROPICA (Mato Grosso)
Fundação Serra das Andorinhas (Pará)
Fundação Mata Virgem (Brasil)
Fundação SOS Amazonia (Acre)
Greenpeace Brasil, Campanha de Florestas (Rio de Janeiro)
Grupo de Trabalho Missionário Evangélico: GTME (Mato Grosso)
Instituto de Antropologia e Meio Ambiente: IAMA (São Paulo)
Instituto de Estudos Amazônicos: IEA (Brasília)
Instituto de Estudos Sócio-Econômicos: INESC (Brasília)
Instituto de Pesquisa em Defesa da Identidade Amazônica: INDIA (Rondônia)
Movimento Nacional de Artistas pela Natureza (Brasília)
Movimento de Educação de Base (Pará)
Movimento de Apoio à Resistência Waímiro Arara: MAREWA (Amazonas)
Núcleo de Direitos Indígenas: NDI (Brasília)
Operação Anchieta: OPAN (Mato Grosso)
Pastoral Indígena da Manaus (Amazonas)
Pastoral Indígena do Alto Solimões (Amazonas)
Proteção Ambiental Cacolemens: PAGA (Rondônia)
Programa de Estudo sobre Terras Indígenas no Brasil: PETI (Rio de Janeiro)
Sindicato de Pequenos Agricultores e Assalariados Rurais de Rio Branco: SINPASA (Acre)
Sindicato dos Professores Particulares do Pará (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Brejo Grande (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Breu Branco (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Eldorado (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Iputuenga (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Marabá (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Novo Repartimento (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Parauapebas (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de São João (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Tucuruí (Pará)
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Educação Pública de Marabá (Pará)
Sociedade Paraense de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos: SDDH (Pará)
União das Nações Indígenas do Acre: UNI/AC (Acre)
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